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FOREWORD
Gemma Andreone1
For many years now, television news broadcasts and newspapers 
throughout Europe and the world have flooded us with stories of grave losses of 
human lives at sea, particularly in the Mediterranean. It is a startling consideration 
that we can become sated, and hardened even to the most catastrophic news 
stories of shipwrecks which involve children, women, young and elderly migrants 
fleeing from countries at their last gasp as a consequence of war, poverty, or 
absence of democratic values and principles.
Those of us who live in the west, and particularly in Europe, who in the 
last decades have seen a marked increase in the number of asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants, are at risk of growing accustomed to living with the reality 
of this tragedy which repeats itself daily in the Mediterranean. But the migration 
continues relentlessly. 
Two great questions hang imperatively over these events: the first 
regards the relationship of the western countries, and in particular the countries 
of the European Union, to the phenomenon of migration, which is constantly on 
the increase, but apparently unstoppable in the context of the international stage 
today. Second, greater thought must be given to marine areas, insofar as these 
have become the theatre for a veritable international extermination of peoples 
coming from the most tried continents and countries.
These two questions, in many cases intersecting and overlapping, call 
for an analysis from a legal standpoint, taking into consideration the constant 
updating of applicable norms, relevant national and international practice, and 
the ceaseless actions, both international and regional, which attempt to face 
situations of  emergency, as well as to find longer term solutions to the problems 
of migration. 
The international Conference which was held in Macedonia on 6th 
October 2015, excellently organized by professor Ana Nikodinovska Krstevska 
1  Gemma Andreone is Senior Research Associate of International Law, Institute for International 
Legal Studies of the Italian National Research Council; Chair of the Cost Action IS1105 Marsafenet; 
Treasurer and Council Member of the International Association of the Law of the Sea.
and professor Borka Tushevska Gavrilovikj, in the context of the Cost Action 
IS1105 Marsafenet, provided an important opportunity to discuss these questions, 
not only among academics, but also with stakeholders directly involved in the 
reception of migrants, or in the rescue of human life at sea. Furthermore, the 
participation of NGOs and persons from Macedonia dealing with overland 
migration from Asia toward Europe enriched the discussion with information 
and points of view which proved most useful for the piecing together of legal 
problems arising from migration, from not only an international, but also a 
national and regional perspective. 
The present volume comprises the written version of some of the 
interventions presented at the Conference. They touch upon the salient points of 
the discussions, and regard the comparison of prospects within international law 
and the regional approaches recently adopted. Their aim is to make a contribution 
to the legal literature currently available, and to offer many points for reflection, 
from the complexity of the legal picture on the subject of migration as a whole, 
and the responsibility of states in the matter of rescue at sea, to the main questions 
relating to problems of security inherent in migration in the Balkans. Many 
other aspects are also considered beyond the legal, arising from this, including 
an analysis of some specific and critical humanitarian points intrinsic to the 
phenomenon of migration, and in particular of the current emergency of asylum 
seeking refugees.
The organizers of the Conference, the editors of this volume, have not 
only achieved a good result from the scientific point of view, but have also 
allowed the inclusion, alongside the international legal analysis, of some salient 
points from other disciplines and non-academic approaches, which have resulted 
in a solid and ample contribution to the treatment of the subject.
Gemma Andreone
ILLEGAL MIGRATION: LEGAL CHALLENGES
AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Elda Belja1 and Simon Manduca2
I. Introduction; II. Provisions in UNCLOS; II. The Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol; III. The IMO’s responses; IV.  Conclusion
I. Introduction3
Migrant smuggling is considered a maritime security threat which, 
due to the particular human element involved, has become a prominent global 
issue. For a very long time, migrants have turned to the sea to escape war torn 
zones, poverty, humanitarian crisis, political instability, and racial or religious 
discrimination. The recent conflicts in different parts of the world have seen 
thousands of people fleeing their countries in the hope of reaching a place with 
a better standard of living. The latest reports from the coast off Turkey have 
however demonstrated once again the serious threat this organized crime poses. 
Migrants are transported on unseaworthy vessels (often small fishing boats with 
extremely poor safety conditions which are severely overcrowded), in atrocious 
conditions, without adequate provisions, on long voyages which result in many 
fatalities every year. Reports note that 2015 is likely to have been the deadliest 
year for migrants escaping violence and poverty in the Middle East and North 
Africa by sea.
Governments have responded to this phenomenon with stricter border 
controls, forcing migrants to make use of criminal organizations to secure 
access to their desired country of destination. The abuse of the desperate need of 
1  Elda Belja is Lecturer in International Maritime Law at the IMO International Maritime Law 
Institute, Malta.
2   Dr. Simon Manduca is Associate member at Camillieri, Delia, Randon and Associates. 
3  This article reflects t he p resentation d elivered o n 6  O ctober 2 015 f or t he p urpose o f the 
MARSAFENET Conference organized in Ohrid on Migrations at Sea: International Law 
Perspectives and Regional Approaches.
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migrants to leave their country of origin has turned migrant smuggling into a very 
profitable business with professional smugglers charging exorbitant fees for their 
services. The suppression of this crime therefore necessitates a global approach 
as every State is affected, especially since the potential for criminals to make use 
of migrant smuggling networks cannot be ignored. It is for these reasons that 
the international community has sought to respond to this threat through various 
means, including the use of a number of multilateral and bilateral initiatives. 
This article will analyse these initiatives with the aim of providing an 
understanding of the legal challenges posed by this crime and, considering the 
recent developments, what could be the way forward for its suppression. To this 
end, a review of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will be provided. This review will be followed by an 
analysis of the key provisions of the main international instrument which deals in 
a comprehensive manner with this matter - the Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Migrant Smuggling Protocol) supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC). 
The Protocol is of great relevance both for the regulatory framework it provides 
as well as for its recognition of the human element central to these offences. (It 
must be remembered that the subject of crime are people and not commodities, 
and therefore any response unavoidably incorporates considerations of human 
rights, humanitarian law and refugee law). The Protocol, as Mallia notes4 also 
presents a regime which works within the recognized system provided by the 
UNCLOS – avoiding problems of flag State exclusivity on the high seas, not by 
challenging the general principles of the law of the sea but rather, by working 
within their parameters. The International Maritime Organization’s response will 
also be discussed briefly.
 I. Provisions in UNCLOS 
Although migrant smuggling is not specifically addressed in UNCLOS, 
Klein comments that migrant smuggling may be catered for within Article 19(2)
(g) where passage is considered to be prejudicial to the peace and good order 
of a State, and therefore non-innocent, in the case of a ship being engaged in 
the ‘the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal 
State’.5
4  Mallia, Patricia; Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security 
through the Creating of a Co-operative Framework, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, The 
Netherlands, 2010, p.127.
5  Klein, Natalie; Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Oxford University Press, the United 
Kingdom, 2011, p.313. See however Gallagher, Anne and David, Fiona; The International Law of 
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Likewise, a State may also be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction6 over 
the smuggling of migrants under Article 27 which states that:
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not 
be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through 
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any 
investigation in connection with any crime committed 
on board the ship during its passage, save only in the 
following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal 
State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the 
country   or the good order of the territorial sea;
(c) […]; or
(d) […].
Therefore, due to the consequences of the offence of migrant smuggling 
possibly extending to the coastal State or disturbing the peace of the country or 
the good order of the territorial sea, criminal jurisdiction may be exercised.
Any infringement of immigration laws which takes place in the territory 
or territorial sea of a Coastal State may be punished7 or prevented8 in its 
contiguous zone in accordance with Article 33(1).
On the high seas9 a vessel is subject to the flag State’s exclusive 
jurisdiction. However, this is not an absolute rule from which no derogation 
is permitted. There are certain instances where interference with the principle 
of mare liberum is permissible in order to suppress unlawful or undesirable 
activities on the high seas.10 There are various terms which are used to denote a 
physical interference with a vessel on the high seas. These include interdiction, 
interception and in UNCLOS the right of visit.
Migrant Smuggling, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014 pp.234-235 who argue that 
‘The reference in the Chapeau of Article 19(2) of UNCLOS to “engag[ing] in any of the following 
activities” indicates that some “activity” is indeed required, such that mere passage, without more, 
would not amount to prejudice to the State. Thus, the mere carriage of smuggled migrants by a 
vessel passing through the territorial waters, destined for a third State, would not, of itself, render 
the passage non-innocent.’ 
6  This may be done through the right of hot pursuit. This is an accepted exception to flag State 
jurisdiction which acknowledges the coastal State’s right to protect its interests and exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction in its territorial waters and is allowed to continue the hot pursuit on the 
high seas.
7  It would be normally the case of outgoing ships. 
8  Any actions of prevention however will not amount to a right of arrest; such actions will be 
limited to inspections and warnings. See Gallagher, Anne and David, Fiona, op.cit., pp.240-241.
9  Considering that the coastal State enjoys rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone which are not 
related to the issue of migrant smuggling, such zone is not discussed as the regime of the High 
Seas would apply. 
10  Guilfoyle, Douglas; Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009, p.4.  
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Whatever term used, the only exception found in UNCLOS to the rule 
of non-interference is the right of visit. The Convention does not specifically 
mention en nomine interception or interdiction, but these will fall under the 
general rubric of the right of visit.11
It is noteworthy that Article 110 of UNCLOS does not specifically 
cater for the right of visit on the high seas in the case of migrant smuggling. 
However, since the migrants are often found on vessels which are not registered 
and usually do not sail under a flag, these vessels may be considered stateless 
vessels for the purposes of Article 110, thus extrapolating this ground to include 
vessels engaged in migrant smuggling and allowing the right of visit. There is 
no explanation in the Convention however on what actions could follow such 
visit. Most regrettably the same ambiguity is also reflected in Article 8(7) of the 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol which will be discussed next. 
 II.  The Migrant Smuggling Protocol 
The primary legal instrument addressing the threat of migrant smuggling 
by sea is the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. The genesis of the Migrant Smuggling 
Protocol may be traced to the IMO, which in 1997 noted, following a proposal 
made by Italy that it was outside the scope of the Organization to deal with the 
trafficking of migrants by sea, leading to the issue being developed as a Protocol 
under the umbrella of transnational organized crime.
This is not an independent treaty but is a Protocol to CATOC adopted on 
15 November 2000. The Convention, which is the key international law treaty 
dealing with transnational organized crime, is supplemented by three Protocols 
dealing with human trafficking, migrant smuggling and the trafficking of 
firearms;12 however to become a Party to any of them, a State must first become 
a Party to the main Convention.13 A State Party to CATOC is not bound by any 
of its Protocols unless it becomes a Party to the Protocol in accordance with the 
provisions thereof.14 The Protocols and the Convention should be interpreted 
together taking into account the purpose of the specific Protocol.15
11 Papastavridis, Efthymios; The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas. Contemporary 
Challenges to the Legal order of the Oceans, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013, p.61.
12  The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children; The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Migrant 
Smuggling Protocol); and The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
13  CATOC, Article 37(2).
14  CATOC, Article 37 (3). 
15  CATOC, Article 37 (4). See also Article 1(1) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. 
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The Convention and Protocols are thus complimentary, with several of 
the provisions of the Convention applying mutatis mutandis to the Protocols.16 
All State Parties agree to take various measures to combat transnational 
organized crime, ranging from criminalization of certain crimes in domestic law, 
to cooperation in enforcement, extradition and mutual legal assistance among 
others.17
The CATOC and the Migrant Smuggling Protocol therefore set out the 
necessary international cooperation for the suppression and criminalization of 
illegal migrant movement across international borders.
The Migrant Smuggling Protocol is designed to set up the appropriate 
legal framework in order to combat the ever growing crime of migrant 
smuggling being committed by criminal groups, while stressing the importance 
of safeguarding the smuggled persons and their human rights. This need to treat 
the migrants in a humane manner and with all their inherent rights is stressed in 
the Preamble to the Protocol.
The Protocol in not novel in structure, and generally follows the pattern 
found in other existing international jurisdictional frameworks, by providing 
a comprehensive structure, requiring the criminalization and punishment of 
particular acts and subjecting State Parties to a range of measures including 
extradition, cooperation, the giving of information and mutual legal assistance.18 
However, as noted by Mallia, the acknowledgment of the link of this crime to 
organized criminal activity, as well as the importance given to the rights and 
safeguards of the migrants due to the particular human element involved in this 
threat, distinguish this Protocol from other legal instruments in maritime security 
law.19 This is all neatly summarized in the statement of purpose of the Protocol 
found in Article 2 which states that ‘[t]he purpose of this Protocol is to prevent 
and combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation among 
States Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.’
The Protocol defines in Article 3 the smuggling of migrants as ‘the 
procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not 
a national or a permanent resident’. It is interesting to note that in the Interpretive 
Notes, the terms ‘financial or other material benefit’ in the definition are deemed 
to include activities of organized criminal groups, but to exclude activities for 
humanitarian reasons or where support is provided based on family ties.20
16   See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 1(2).
17  Kraska, James, Pedrozo, Raul; International Maritime Security Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publi-
shers, 2013, pp. 660-661.
18   Mallia, Patricia, op. cit., p 116.
19   Ibid., p. 117.
20   UN Doc A/55/383/Add.1 para. 88.  
18                                                                                        ELDA BELJA, SIMON MANDUCA
The Protocol provides for direct application only to:
...the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the 
offences established in accordance with article 6 of this 
Protocol, where the offences are transnational in nature 
and involve an organized criminal group, as well as to the 
protection of the rights of persons who have been the object 
of such offences.21
This, hence, would seem to exclude ad hoc or small-scale operations 
which do not involve an organized criminal group or which are not transnational 
in nature. It is important however to recall Article 34 (2) of CATOC which clearly 
stipulates that ‘offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of 
this Convention shall be established in the domestic law of each State Party 
independently of the transnational nature or the involvement of an organized 
criminal group…’. It is also relevant to point out that other offences established 
under the Protocol, such as facilitating illegal stay or production of fraudulent 
travel documents, could easily take place within a single State and thus lack any 
element of transnationality. 
An innovative provision, in line with the main aim of the Protocol, is 
established in Article 5 which excludes criminal liability for the migrant purely 
for endeavouring to be smuggled. This is, however, not a general exclusion 
from liability for the migrants as they may still be held liable for other criminal 
offences under the domestic law of a State Party which they may have committed 
during their voyage.22 This is explicitly stated in Article 6(4) which allows State 
Parties to take measures against any person who commits an offence against its 
domestic laws.
Article 6 provides a list of mandatory criminal offences which must be 
adopted into State Parties legislation. The Interpretive Notes explain that with 
regard to this article the offences should be considered as being part of activities 
undertaken by organized criminal groups.23 When committed intentionally 
and with the aim of obtaining in any manner a financial or material benefit the 
following are to be considered as criminal offences:
(a) The smuggling of migrants;
(b) When committed for the purpose of enabling the 
smuggling of migrants:
(i) Producing a fraudulent travel or identity document;
21   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 4.
22   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.118.
23   UN Doc A/55/383/Add.1 Para. 92.  
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(ii) Procuring, providing or possessing such a document;
(c) Enabling a person who is not a national or a permanent 
resident to remain in the State concerned without complying 
with the necessary requirements for legally remaining in 
the State by the means mentioned in subparagraph (b) of 
this paragraph or any other illegal means.24
The Protocol also obliges State Parties to criminalize inchoate offences 
related to those in Article 6(1), such as the attempting to commit an offence,25 
participating as an accomplice,26 or inciting others to commit an offence27 
listed therein. Article 6 also introduces the concept of aggravated offences. The 
Legislative Guide for the Implementation of CATOC and its Protocols notes that, 
‘Without adding further offences, States parties are also required to incorporate 
into some of the offences established in accordance with the Protocol specific 
circumstances that would ensure that cases in which they have occurred are taken 
more seriously. The obligation is fully mandatory for all offences except those 
of participating as an accomplice and organizing or directing others to commit 
offences, which are made subject to the basic concepts of the legal system of the 
implementing State party.’28 Legislators are required to recognize as aggravated 
offences those that endanger, or are likely to endanger, the lives or safety of the 
migrants concerned; or that entail inhuman or degrading treatment, including for 
exploitation, of such migrants.29 
The consequences of finding an offence as ‘aggravated’ will depend on 
the legal system of the State criminalizing the offence. As noted in the Legislative 
Guide for the Implementation of CATOC and its Protocols ‘this could take the 
form of either complete parallel offences, such as aggravated smuggling, or of 
provisions that require the courts to consider longer or more severe sentences 
where the aggravating conditions are present and the accused have been 
convicted of one or more of the basic offences established in accordance with 
the Protocol. The fundamental obligation is to ensure that, where the aggravating 
circumstances are present, offenders are subjected to at least the risk of harsher 
punishments.’30
24   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 6(1). 
25   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 6(2)(a). This offence is established ‘Subject to the basic 
concepts’ of the legal system of the State as not all legal systems incorporate the concept of 
criminal attempts. See Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the CATOC and its Protocols 
at paras 44 and 51. 
26   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 6(2)(b).
27   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 6(2)(c).
28   See Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the CATOC and its Protocols at para 45. 
29   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 6(3)(a) and (b).
30   See Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the CATOC and its Protocols at para 46.
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Most regrettably the Protocol does not make any reference to the penalties 
to be imposed. The final text of the Protocol did not include a provision which 
would require State Parties to make the commission of Article 6 offences ‘liable 
to sanctions that take into account the grave nature of the offence’, leaving the 
matter to be regulated by Article 11(1) of CATOC. Gallagher and David argue 
that perhaps ‘it can be assumed that as such provision was already included in 
the Convention [31], its repetition in the Protocol was considered unnecessary.’32 
Considering that there are provisions of CATOC which apply mutatis 
mutandis to the Protocol, States are also obliged to take further legislative 
measures regarding the offences established under the Protocol.33 These measures 
include, inter alia, the obligation to criminalize the laundering of the proceeds 
of migrant smuggling;34 ensure migrant smuggling offences are given broad 
jurisdictional application;35 ensure a long statute of limitations period for migrant 
smuggling offences;36 criminalize obstruction of justice;37 protect victims and 
witnesses from potential retaliation or intimidation;38 take appropriate measures 
to encourage those involved in migrant smuggling to cooperate with or assist 
national authorities,39 etc. 
Part II of the Protocol specifically addresses the smuggling of migrants 
by sea. It provides for a legal mechanism to gain consent for boarding and requires 
States in Article 7 to ‘cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and 
suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea, in accordance with the international 
law of the sea.’
Although not stated in the Protocol, the Interpretive Notes state that the 
travaux preparatoires should indicate that none of the measures contemplated 
in Part II of the Protocol may be taken in the territorial sea of any State without 
express permission or authorization.40 Flag State authorization is also required on 
the high seas.41Any action taken must aid in the prevention of migrant smuggling 
by sea and be based on the vessel actually endeavouring to commit the crime 
of migrant smuggling. The Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the 
CATOC and its Protocols importantly notes that the establishment of jurisdiction 
31   Referring to CATOC, Article 11(1).
32   Gallagher, Anne and David, Fiona, op.cit., p. 52.
33   Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
34   CATOC, Article 6.
35   CATOC, Article 15.
36   CATOC, Article 11(5).
37   CATOC, Article 23.
38   CATOC, Articles 24 and 25. 
39   CATOC, Article 26. 
40   UN Doc A/55/383/Add.1 Para. 98.
41   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.120.
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over smuggling by sea is a prerequisite for the effective implementation of the 
section on migrant smuggling by sea.42
Article 8 sets out the regime for permissible boarding and inspection. 
Although this Protocol does not enter into the same level of detail as that found 
in the counterpart provisions in the United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Mallia notes that this is 
not to be considered a limitation due to the use of the words ‘inter alia’ in Article 
8(2) indicating that the list is not exhaustive, and that other measures may be 
authorized.43
If a flag State has reasonable grounds to believe that a vessel flying its 
flag, claiming its registry without authorization or is without nationality and is 
engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, Article 8(1) allows the flag State 
to request the assistance of other State Parties in order to prevent the use of the 
vessel for migrant smuggling. State Parties are under an obligation to give such 
assistance as is possible within their means.
Article 8(2) permits a State Party which has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a vessel flying the flag of another State Party is engaged44 in migrant 
smuggling by sea, to request confirmation of registry, and upon confirmation 
request authorization to take appropriate measures necessary. These may ‘inter 
alia’ include authorization from the flag State to board and search the vessel, 
and if evidence of migrant smuggling by sea is found, to take any suitable 
actions necessary with respect to the vessel, the cargo and the people on board. 
Any results from measures that are taken following this authorization must be 
promptly notified to the flag State.45
An unfortunate omission in the final Protocol is a definition section 
of what is a permissible State action as was proposed in Article I of the 1997 
Italian proposal for a Multilateral Convention to Combat Illegal Migration by 
Sea.46 This Article defines the following basic steps of permissible enforcement 
jurisdiction:
a. Verifying the vessels right to fly its flag; the vessel may 
be requested to give information on its nationality and 
the nationality of its crew, its port of departure and its 
destination;
42   Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the CATOC and its Protocols at para 60 (i).
43   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.124.
44   The term ‘engaged’ in this provision should be interpreted widely according to the Interpretive 
Notes in order to cater for both direct and indirect use of vessels involved in migrant smuggling, 
without however including a vessel which has rescued migrants being smuggled by another vessel. 
See UN Doc A/55/383/Add.1 Para. 100.
45   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 8(3). 
46   LEG 76/11/1 (1 August 1997) as cited in Mallia, Patrcia, op.cit., pp. 115-116.
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b. Stopping the vessel: the vessel may be ordered to 
stop or to change course and reduce speed appropriately, 
following the procedures mentioned in subparagraph a) 
above, so that a team of inspectors may board the vessel to 
ascertain the truth of the information communicated and 
whether any migrants are on board.
c. On board visit: when the vessel is stopped or has 
changed course as ordered and at the speed ordered, the 
aforementioned inspection team shall board the vessel 
to carry out the necessary verification of documents and 
inspections, in order to ascertain whether the vessel is 
involved in the trafficking of migrants;
d. Diversion: if the vessel refuses to permit an on-board 
visit or if the on-board visit inspection reveals that 
irregularities are being committed, the vessel shall be 
ordered to go back to the port of departure or to divert 
to the nearest port of a contracting party, designated 
according to art L, and the state of which the migrants are 
nationals shall be informed of the outcome of the on-board 
visit. If the vessel fails to comply with such order, it shall 
be escorted to the prescribed destination.
As Mallia explains, ‘[…] clear description of what is permitted and what 
each method of control consists of would be of great use in providing certainty, 
especially when one considers the dearth of information in this area.’47
State Parties must respond to any request for a confirmation of registry, a 
determination if the vessel is entitled to fly its flag, or any authorization requested 
by another State Party expeditiously according to Article 8(4).
Article 8(5) retains the principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction while 
endeavouring to facilitate cooperation between the requesting State and the 
flag State. It grants the flag State the right to subject any authorization given 
to conditions which must be mutually agreed, including conditions relating to 
responsibility and the extent of the authorization. However the provision goes 
on to state that:
A State Party shall take no additional measures without 
the express authorization of the flag State, except those 
necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons 
or those which derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.
47   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.116.
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The phrase ‘consistent with Article 7 of this Protocol,’ in Article 8(5) is 
specifically mentioned and Mallia opines that while in theory authorization for 
any action may be refused, any refusal that amounts to a lack of cooperation 
would contradict the obligation to cooperate in the suppression of migrant 
smuggling by sea found in Article 7.48
An appropriate competent authority to respond to any of the abovementioned 
request must also be established by the State Parties and this authority must be 
notified to all other State Parties within one month by the Secretary-General.49
Article 8(7) allows any State Party that reasonably suspects that a ship 
without nationality or one assimilated to be without nationality, and engaged in 
migrant smuggling by sea, to be boarded and searched and to take all appropriate 
measures following confirmation of migrant smuggling. This is in conformity 
with Articles 92(2) and 110 of UNCLOS.50
It is interesting to note that the Legislative Guide for the Implementation 
of the CATOC and its Protocols at para 95 suggests that ‘In addition and although 
not a requirement under the Convention or the Protocol, States parties may wish 
also to establish their jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas flying the flag of 
another State party as well as over those without nationality, as this will ensure 
the proper functioning of the measures provided for under part II of the Protocol.’ 
Mallia explains that the provision of the Protocol regarding jurisdiction on high 
seas over stateless vessels is in sharp contrast with the proposal of Italy which 
allowed a State to act only ‘when the vessel is “undoubtedly” bound for the State’s 
coasts or if the vessels is “armed or governed or manned by its nationals”.’51 
In her opinion, such shift indicates that migrant smuggling is now viewed as a 
crime which affects the security of States generally and is therefore an exception 
to the established rule that a State must rely on some basis of jurisdiction when 
exercising enforcement jurisdiction in international waters.52 The Protocol also 
omitted any reference to a territorial link which would have entitled a State 
Party to take action were the vessel to enter its territorial waters or if she was 
reasonably suspected to be bound for the State Party’s territorial waters.53
Specific safeguard provisions are found in Article 9 of the Protocol and 
require the boarding State to ensure the humane treatment and safety of persons 
aboard and that any measures taken are environmentally sound.54 Article 9(1) 
states that when any of the measures are taken pursuant to Article 8, the State 
Party shall:
48   Ibid., p. 124.
49   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 8(6). 
50   Kraska, James and Pedrozo, Raul op.cit., p.665.  
51   Mallia, Patricia, op.cit., p.114. 
52   Ibidem. 
53   Ibid., p.116. 
54   Guilfoyle, Douglas; op.cit., p.185.
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(a) Ensure the safety and humane treatment of the persons on 
board;
(b) Take due account of the need not to endanger the security 
of the vessel or its cargo;
(c) Take due account of the need not to prejudice the 
commercial or legal interests of the flag State or any other 
interested State;
(d) Ensure, within available means, that any measure taken 
with regard to the vessel is environmentally sound.
In the case of any loss or damage that occurs during any measure 
undertaken under Article 8, Article 9(2) provides that if this is proved to be 
unfounded, liability for compensation will be due, excluding however a scenario 
where the vessel has committed any act which may justify the actions of the 
other State Party.
Article 9(3) goes on to ensure that any measure taken shall not interfere 
with or affect:
(a) The rights and obligations and the exercise of jurisdiction 
of coastal States in accordance with the international law 
of the sea; or
(b)  The authority of the flag State to exercise jurisdiction 
and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
involving the vessel.
In this way the boarding procedure remains in conformity with the 
international law of the sea and preserves the general principle of the primacy of 
flag State authority.
As with all other boarding regimes, the boarding and any other measures 
taken pursuant to Article 8 are limited to warships or military aircraft, or other 
ships or aircraft that are authorized and clearly marked as being on Government 
service.55
Part III of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol deals with the issues of 
prevention, cooperation and other measures. It implements several necessary 
support provisions including provisions related to information,56 border 
measures,57 security and control of documents,58 legitimacy and validity of 
55   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 9(4). 
56   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 10.
57   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 11. 
58   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 12. 
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documents,59 training and technical cooperation,60 as well as considering the 
conclusion of bilateral and regional arrangements to combat migrant smuggling 
by sea,61 among others.
Article 15 importantly obliges State Parties to take measures to ensure that 
it provides or strengthens information programmes to increase public awareness 
of the fact that the conduct set forth in article 6 is a criminal offence.62
Two innovative articles are found in this Part which are specific to this 
threat. These are Article 16 dealing with the protection of migrants, and Article 
18 dealing with the return of migrants.
State Parties are obliged by Article 16 to take all required measures 
to preserve and protect the rights of the smuggled migrants, with particular 
emphasis on their ‘right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ State Parties are 
also required to take measures to protect smuggled migrants from ‘violence that 
may be inflicted upon them, whether by individuals or groups, by reason of being 
the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol.’63 Assistance should 
be provided to those whose lives or safety are endangered from smuggling64 and 
in respect of detained smuggled migrants, States must ensure prompt notification 
to and communication with consular officers. It must also be noted that although 
human rights obligations do arise, the migrants may also enjoy further protection 
under Refugee Law.65
Article 18 refers to an agreement to ‘facilitate and accept, without undue 
or reasonable delay’66 the return of migrants to their State of origin, of which 
they are either nationals or permanent residents, when the migrants have been 
interdicted in a transit or destination State.67
Once a request for a return is made, the apparent State of origin must 
verify if the migrant is actually its national without delay.68 In the case where 
the migrant is found to be a national of a State Party, and is without proper 
documentation, the Protocol obliges the State of origin to issue such documents 
as may be necessary in order to facilitate the return.69 An obligation is also placed 
on all State Parties to ensure the safety and dignity of the migrants and to proceed 
with the return in a systematic manner.70
59   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 13. 
60   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 14. 
61   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 17. 
62   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 15.
63   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 16 (2).
64   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 16 (3).
65   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.14.
66   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 18(1).
67   Kraska, James and Pedrozo, Raul op.cit., p.666.
68   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 18(3).
69   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 18(4).
70   Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Article 18(5).
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Article 18(8) also specifies that this Article will not affect any other 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements which may be in place regarding the return 
of migrants. The main difficulty with this provision is that migrants often do not 
have any proper documentation thus making identification and return particularly 
problematic.
 III.  The IMO’s response 
The IMO has long been involved in the suppression of migrant 
smuggling by sea. A number of incidents in the 1990s may be considered as 
the catalysts which drove the IMO to address the issue of migrant smuggling 
by sea.71 The IMO primarily focused on this from the perspective of improving 
the safety of life at sea. The 1993 M/V Golden Venture incident, involving a 
Honduran-registered cargo ship running aground off the New York coast, 
while having 300 Chinese migrants aboard, stressed the hazardous conditions 
related to the smuggling of migrants by sea.72 The IMO Assembly’s response, 
just a few months after the incident, was to adopt Resolution A.773(18) entitled 
Enhancement of the Safety of Life at Sea by the Prevention and Suppression of 
Unsafe Practices Associated with the Smuggling of Aliens by Ships, establishing 
a cooperative framework to prevent maritime migrant smuggling catastrophes.73 
Through said resolution, IMO noted with great concern that numerous incidents 
involving vessels engaged in migrant smuggling have seriously endangered life 
at sea as a result of sickness, disease and fatalities that have occurred. For these 
reasons, Government were called upon, as a matter of urgency, to co-operate to 
supress unsafe practices associated with migrant smuggling.
Another incident in 1996 showed that work still needed to be done. 
This involved the M/V Yioham, another Honduran-registered vessel, which was 
overloaded and collided with a small boat that was leaving Marsaxlokk, Malta 
on its way to take the 283 illegal Asian migrants on their last leg of their long 
journey to Italy. The collision resulted in the death of the migrants on board who 
all drowned. The grave incident highlighted once again the abundant use of sub-
standard vessels for migrant smuggling by sea. Once again the IMO responded 
and adopted Resolution A.867(20)49774 in response to this tragedy in 1997. 
This Resolution acknowledged that the issue of migrant smuggling should be 
considered a crucial aspect of the safety of life at sea and that the use of sub-
71   Kraska, James and Pedrozo, Raul op.cit., p.666.
72   Ibid., p.667.
73   Ibid. 
74   IMO Doc. A.867(20), Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with the Trafficking or Transport 
of Migrants by Sea adopted on 27 November 1997. 
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standard vessels to transport migrants had resulted in ‘heavy loss of life’.75 The 
Resolution is important as it recommended that the IMO Secretary-General should 
ensure that the Organization participates in the development of a convention or 
other instrument intended to combat the trafficking or transport of migrants by 
sea and to bring said Resolution and any other work of the Organization on the 
matter to the attention of the United Nations and other relevant organizations 
and that IMO should recommend the adoption of an international instrument 
intended to combat the trafficking or transport of migrants by sea. 
The continued concerns of the Organization were also addressed in 1998 
by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee which eventually led to the adoption of 
IMO Circular MSC/Circ.896, Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices 
Associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea.76 These non-
binding measures, addressing unsafe practices pertaining to migrant smuggling 
by sea, were adopted as an interim measure77 anticipating the imminent entry 
into force of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol in 2000.
This Circular was subsequently amended in 2001,78 where its stated 
purpose is to ‘promote awareness and co-operation among Contracting 
Governments… so that they may address more efficiently unsafe practices 
associated with the trafficking and transport of migrants by sea which have an 
international dimension’.79
Following the Tampa incident in 2001 the IMO again responded. The 
Tampa incident, where an Indonesian boat, with 433 people on board was in 
distress, received assistance from the Norwegian merchant ship Tampa. Upon 
requesting permission to enter the closest port from the site of rescue to disembark 
the people rescued, permission was denied by the Australian Government.80 The 
IMO Assembly responded by adopting Resolution A.920(22) entitled Review of 
Safety Measures and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 
recommending the review of procedures regarding the safeguarding of rescued 
persons, regardless of nationality, and encouraging coastal States to deal with such 
persons satisfactorily in order to prevent incidents like the Tampa reoccurring.81 
75   Kraska, James and Pedrozo, Raul op.cit., p.668.
76   IMO Doc. MSC/Circ.896, Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices Associated with 
the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea adopted on 16 December 1998.
77   Roach Ashley J, ‘Initiatives to enhance maritime security at sea’, (2004) 28 Marine Policy, p. 
43.
78   IMO Doc. MSC/Circ.896/Rev.1, Interim Measures for Combating Unsafe Practices Associated 
with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea, 12 June 2001.
79   Ibid., para 3.
80   ‘The State of the World’s Refugees 2006 –Chapter 2 Safeguarding asylum: Box 2.3 The 
Tampa Affair: interception and rescue at sea’ (UNHCR, 19 April 2006) at http://www.unhcr.
org/4444d3c320.html.
81   ‘Trafficking or transport of illegal migrants by sea / Persons rescued at sea’ at http://www.imo.
org/OurWork/Facilitation/IllegalMigrants/Pages/Default.aspx.
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The Assembly requested the review of the existing international conventions and 
IMO instruments to identify any ‘existing gaps, inconsistencies, ambiguities, 
vagueness or other inadequacies’82 and to take any appropriate action necessary 
to ensure that any survivors of distress incidents are given appropriate assistance, 
vessels that have assisted such persons are able to take them to a place of safety 
and all survivors, regardless of their status, are treated humanely.
This eventually led to the 2004 amendments, where the Maritime Safety 
Committee adopted amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention and the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) as 
well as adopting a set of Guidelines83 on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at 
Sea. The purpose of these Guidelines is ‘to provide guidance to Governments 
and to shipmasters with regard to humanitarian obligations and obligations under 
the relevant international law relating to treatment of persons rescued at sea’,84 
thereby aiding them in their understanding of the necessary obligations that must 
be undertake under international law.
Both Conventions oblige either the ship and flag States or coastal 
States respectfully to render assistance to persons in distress at sea.85 These 
amendments focused on the lacunae that existed in these Conventions regarding 
the disembarkation of people rescued at sea, and the duty to take them to a place 
of safety,86 therefore, catering for these lacunae by obliging the ships Master, 
or the coastal State to deliver the persons rescued to a place of safety. The term 
place of safety, although not defined, was described in the Guidelines as being:
…a location where rescue operations are considered to 
terminate. It is also a place where the survivors’ safety of 
life is no longer threatened and where their basic human 
needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be 
met. Further, it is a place from which transportation 
arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final 
destination.87
A possible issue may arise with the obligations contained in the 
amendments to the aforementioned Conventions to provide a place of safety as 
this does not, however, mean that the State responsible for the Search and Rescue 
82   IMO Assembly Resolution A.920(22), Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for the 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, Annex 1.
83   IMO Resolution MSC.167(78), Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea adopted 
on 20 May 2004.
84   Ibid., Annex 1.1.
85   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.132.
86   Ibid., p.129.
87   IMO Resolution MSC.167(78), op.cit., para. 6.12.
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region is automatically obliged to disembark the persons rescued in its own area. 
Therefore incidents such as the Tampa may not necessarily be satisfactorily 
addressed.88 This may also be seen in the 2009 Pinar incident, where the Turkish 
Merchant vessel Pinar, following the rescue of 153 migrants off Lampedusa, 
was refused entry into Italian territorial waters on the premise that the migrants 
were rescued in Malta’s Search and Rescue zone.89 These incidents are numerous 
in the Mediterranean. Another case in point was the 2013 M/V Salamis incident, 
where the Turkish tanker, en route from Libya to Syracuse, rescued 102 migrants. 
Following this, the vessel was denied entry into Malta’s territorial waters, Malta 
claiming that the tanker should have returned to Libya, and not Malta, as this was 
the closest safe port. After two days of being anchored at sea outside Maltese 
territorial waters, the migrants were ultimately accepted by Italy on humanitarian 
grounds.
 IV.  Conclusion
The threat of migrant smuggling by sea is constantly growing. Social 
and economic considerations will persist in encouraging irregular migration to 
continue, aided by strong incentives of profit for organized criminal groups to 
continue the smuggling trade. Many lives are therefore at risk every day, hence 
necessitating that Governments take effective action to combat this threat.90 The 
human element involved in this crime cannot be ignored and the need to respect 
the humanity and dignity of the persons smuggled is of paramount importance.
The legal framework set out above attempts to effectively address this 
ever-changing threat by adapting as necessary to fill any legislative lacunae91 and 
to give appropriate guidance to flag States, Governments and shipmasters. The 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol and IMO initiatives successfully fill the legislative 
88   United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Issue Paper, ‘Combating Transnational Organized 
Crime Committed at Sea’ at 22-23.
89   Ibid., at 23.
90   Kraska, James and Pedrozo, Raul op.cit., p.689.
91   It is noteworthy that at the time of the preparation of this presentation, the European Commission 
had expressed its intention to make proposals to improve the existing EU legal framework which is 
composed of Directive 2002/90/EC establishing a common definition of the offense of facilitation 
of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and 
residence to tackle migrant smuggling in an attempt to ensure that appropriate criminal sanctions 
are in place while avoiding risks of criminalization of those who provide humanitarian assistance 
to migrants in distress. See COM (2015) 285 issued in Brussels on 27 May 2015 at http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/ asylum/general/docs/eu_action_plan_against_
migrant_smuggling_en.pdf
on the European Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2015-2020).
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gap left in UNCLOS which does not directly address the issue. This has been 
done by introducing enforcement procedures which build on previous experience, 
notably the case of the suppression of drug trafficking, and remaining in line 
with the general provisions of UNCLOS.92 The above instruments thus build 
a sturdy platform from which this maritime security threat may be suppressed. 
The Migrant Smuggling Protocol is also important as it simultaneously provides 
States with an effective enforcement mechanism to combat this threat while still 
emphasizing the rights of the persons involved owing to the unique nature of this 
crime.
This area of maritime security law, however, cannot remain static and 
must continue to evolve as the crime does. Cooperation amongst all those 
involved, in order to ensure a coordinated, effective effort is in place, remains of 
utmost importance in order to attempt to respond to this maritime security threat. 
The IMO has successfully reacted to incidents which have occurred over the 
years in order to prevent repetitions and further ensure the protection of the safety 
of lives at sea, irrespective of who the persons are. International multilateral and 
bilateral efforts must continue to be made in the area of migrant smuggling by 
sea to ensure an appropriate response may be taken to this critical challenge.
92   Mallia, Patricia; op.cit., p.127.
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 I. Introduction 
 
 Only in January 2016 there had been 403 people dead or missing in 
the Mediterranean Sea, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR).2 In 2015, 3772 people perished their lives in these 
waters.3 All these tragic deadly sea incidents mark the significance and urgency 
of the problem of migration by sea. Indeed, thousands of people nowadays often 
undertake very perilous journeys, putting their lives into serious danger in order 
to flee from their country of origin, especially from Syria, Eritrea or Iraq. And 
they flee by whatever means possible, including overcrowded and unseaworthy 
vessels. Such vessels are often at risk of sinking and indeed many do sink, with 
the result that thousands of lives are lost every year.
The challenges in the Mediterranean are mirrored in other regions. 
For example, according to a Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of 17 October 2014 on the situation in 
Yemen, ‘there has been a sharp increase this year [2014] in the number of migrants 
and asylum-seekers losing their lives in attempts to get to Yemen, mainly from 
the Horn of Africa, with more deaths at sea in 2014 than in the last three years 
1  Efthymios D. Papastravridis is a Part-time Lecturer in Public International Law, Democritus 
University of Thrace and Research Fellow, Academy of Athens, papastavridis @academyofathens.
gr.
2   See at <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php> (accessed on 9 February 2016). 
3    See at <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/default/files/Mediterranean_ Update_ 29_January_2 
016_0.pdf> (accessed on 9 February 2016).
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combined… bring the yearly tally for 2014 to 215, exceeding the combined total 
for 2011, 2012 and 2013 of 179’.4 Equally serious is the problem in the Asia-Pacific 
region. While there is no ‘boat crisis’ on the scale seen in Indochina in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the maritime migration movements remain considerable.5
 States and the international community have not remained idle; yet, the 
response is more tailored towards averting the ‘threat’ posed by maritime migration to 
their ‘territorial integrity’ rather than saving these people’s lives. It is worrisome that 
the need to save the lives of the contemporary ‘boat people’ is underestimated. 
Even the aftermath of the shocking death of more than 700 people in mid-April 
2015,6 the EU’s response has not been comprehensive and satisfactory, having 
decided only the increase of the resources and of the operational area of the 
existing FRONTEX-coordinated operations in the region7 as well as the launch of 
EUNAVFOR MED,-later renamed as Operation Sophia- an EU naval operation 
designed primarily to fight smuggling of migrants in the central Mediterranean 
and only incidentally to save lives at sea.8 
Besides this unfortunate inaction of the relevant stakeholders on the 
policy level, there are also certain gaps in the legal framework. Suffice to note that 
while there is a clear duty of the master to provide assistance in case of vessels 
or persons in distress at sea, there is no equally clear obligation on the part of the 
flag States or the coastal State to accept the rescued persons in their territory.9 
This unwillingness of the coastal states to allow disembarkation, in conjunction 
with the costs incurred through uncertainty and delay, which fall entirely on 
the ship-owner, put the masters of the rescuing vessels in a predicament. As a 
consequence, many ships have ignored distress calls, leading to significant loss 
of life.10
4  See UNHCR, ‘2014 becomes the deadliest year at sea off Yemen’, News Stories (17 October 
2014) at <http://www.unhcr.org/544103b06.html> 
5   Reportedly, in 2012 Australia received 17,202 asylum seekers by boat, its highest annual number. 
See Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Boat arrivals in Australia since 1976’ (Research Paper, 
Australian Parliamentary Library, updated 23 July 2013) 22, as cited in J. Mc Adam, ‘Australia and 
Asylum Seekers’, 25 International Journal of Refugee Law (2013), 435, at 445.
6   See e.g. the Guardian, ‘700 Migrants feared dead in Mediterranean shipwreck’ (19 April 2015) 
at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-
shipwreck-worst-yet>
7   See Conclusions of the Special Meeting of the EU Council of 23 April 2015 at <http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/04/23/> and also <http://frontex.europa.
eu/news/frontex-expands-its-joint-operation-triton-udpbHP>
8   See further information at <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-
med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf> (accessed on 29 January 2016). 
9   In the words of J. Pugash, ‘the master of the ship is obliged to rescue those in peril on the sea, but 
no state is bound to accept those rescued’, see id ‘The Dilemma of the Sea Refugee’, 18 Harvard 
Journal of International Law (1977), p. 578.
10  See E. Willheim, ‘M.V. Tampa: The Australian Response’, 15 International Journal of Refugee 
Law (2003), 159, at 168.
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It is however this exact duty of the shipmasters to render assistance at 
sea that is the key for minimizing the immense number of deaths at sea. Rather 
than downplaying the obligations of the flag States of private vessels and instead 
crying out for more duties on the part of the coastal States and the EU or even 
NATO,11 it is our submission that the flag State’s role is vital in this regard and 
there is the urgent need to be reinvigorated. Thus, in the present contribution, we 
will first discuss the obligations of the flag State under international law, both the 
law of the sea and the human rights law in respect of rescue-at-sea and then will 
address how flag States of both private and state vessels do incur responsibility 
for violation of the rules of international law, when they fail to save lives at 
sea. Finally, there will be some propositions with respect to how the flag State’s 
duties can be more adequately met.
II. The Legal Regime of Rescue-at-Sea
and the Obligations of the Flag State 
    1.  The Law of the Sea Framework
The duty to assist persons in distress at sea is a long-established rule of 
customary international law. It extends to both other vessels and coastal States 
in the vicinity, and all persons, including irregular maritime migrants, remain 
protected. The duty to rescue has been codified in the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOSC).12 LOSC prescribes relevant duties for both the flag and 
the coastal States. With regard to flag States, article 98 (1) of LOSC provides 
that:
‘Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can 
do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew, or the passengers … to render 
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost … and to proceed 
to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need for assistance, in so 
far as such action may be reasonably be expected of him.’
The first pertinent question in this context is what qualifies as ‘distress’. 
At the outset, ‘distress’ is not defined by LOSC; yet the term ‘distress phase’ 
has been defined in paragraph 1.3.13 of the Annex of the 1979 International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) as ‘a situation 
11   There have been reports for a more active role of NATO in assisting Turkey in controlling its 
borders and saving people at sea; see at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
migrants-nato-idUSKCN0VH1IL> (accessed on 10 February 2016).
12   See: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 397, entered into force 
16 November 1994; as at 7 January 2015, LOSC has 167 parties, including the EC: <http://www.
un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea> (accessed on 9 February 2016) [hereinafter: LOSC].
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wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is 
threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance’. 
Further clarifications have been provided in relevant jurisprudence. For example, 
in the Eleanor case it was held that distress must entail urgency, but that ‘there 
need not be immediate physical necessity’.13 In the words of the US Supreme 
Court, the test of distress is that the circumstances would produce in “the mind 
of a skillful mariner, a well-grounded apprehension of the loss of the vessel and 
cargo or of the lives of the crew”.14 
In the EU context, the 2010 European Council Decision, which was 
subsequently annulled by the Court of Justice of the EU, indicated that the 
existence of a situation of distress should not be determined exclusively on 
the basis of an actual request for assistance. A number of objective factors, 
such as the seaworthiness of the vessel, the number of passengers on board, 
the availability of supplies, the presence of qualified crew and navigation 
equipment, the prevailing weather and sea conditions, as well as the presence 
of particularly vulnerable, injured, or deceased persons, should be taken into 
account.15 Interestingly, Regulation 656/2014 on FRONTEX operations at sea 
reiterates these factors.16
The next question and the more important for the present purposes, i.e. for 
determining when States would be responsible for failing to save lives at sea, is 
what is the content and nature of the obligations under the LOSC. From a face 
reading of article 98(1) of LOSC, it is apparent that the responsibility to rescue 
and provide assistance rests initially with the master of the rescuing ship and 
entails the duty to deliver the rescued people to a place of safety. The obligation 
incumbent upon the master is without qualification and no distinction must 
be made according to the legal status of the persons to be rescued.17 The only 
13   The Eleanor case (1809) 165 English Reports p. 1068. See also R. Barnes, ‘The International 
Law of the Sea and Migration Control’, in V. Mitsilegas & B. Ryan (eds.), Extraterritorial 
Immigration Control (The Hague: Brill, 2010), 103, at 135.
14   See The New York [1818] 3 Wheaton 59 at 68; compare The Rebecca (1929) 4 Reports of 
In3ternational Arbitral Awards 444 at 447–8.
15   Council Decision of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the 
surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by 
the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union (2010/252/EU), [2010] OJ L 111/20, para. 1.3, 
Part II, Annex. The Decision was annulled by the Court of Justice of the EU; see ECJ, European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union, 5 September 2012, Case C-355/10 (2012).adopted.
16   See Article 9 (f) of Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the 
context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
[2014] OJ L 189/93. 
17   See e.g. article 11 of the 1910 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to Assistance and Salvage at Sea.
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exception is the extent to which it would be unreasonable to render assistance. 
Accordingly, if the vessel is too far away, the rescue vessel is ill-equipped to 
render assistance or other vessels are more readily available to render assistance, 
then the master may not be required to render assistance.
With respect to the obligations of the flag State as such, every flag State 
must require the master of a ship, whether a State or private ship flying the 
State’s flag, to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, 
when informed of their need for assistance. This obligation of the flag State is 
essentially an obligation of result, in the sense that the flag State has to achieve a 
certain result, i.e. to provide for the duty in question in its domestic legislation. 
Article 98 (1) is non-self-executing and requires implementing legislation to 
acquire the force of law.18 Besides this, there is no other obligation of result, such 
as an obligation to guarantee that the people in distress will be saved.19 
In addition, the flag State is under a ‘due diligence’ obligation to monitor 
whether the masters of vessels flying its flag discharge these duties.20 The due 
diligence obligations of flag States were discussed in length in the ITLOS 
Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015 on the Request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission, in which the Tribunal acknowledged that the flag States are under 
such obligations in relation to Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU 
Fishing) within the EEZ of third States.21 It can tenably be supported that these 
duties apply mutatis mutandis in relation to the rescue obligations of the flag 
States under article 98 (1) of LOSC. Such duties involve an obligation not only 
to adopt appropriate national “rules and measures”, but also to exercise “a certain 
level of vigilance in their enforcement”, including exercising “administrative 
control” over relevant “public and private operators”.22 
18  For example, Barnes reports that ‘in the UK the master has a duty, upon receiving a distress 
signal, to proceed to their assistance, unless he is unable…Failure to do so is a criminal offence’; 
see id, ‘Refugee Law at Sea’, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2004), 47, at 50 
(fn 12).
19  The classification of obligations, for example between obligations of result and obligations of 
conduct in international law, can be traced back to Roberto Ago’s term as a Special Rapporteur of 
the International Law Commission, on the topic of State Responsibility, see Sixth Report on State 
Responsibility by Mr Ago, Special Rapporteur, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
(vol II, Part One 1967) 4, 20. See also Jean Combacau, ‘Obligations de résultat et obligations de 
comportement: quelques questions et pas de réponse’ in Mélanges offerts à Paul Reuter, Le droit 
international: unité et diversité (Pedone 1981), 181.
20  See generally on the obligations of flag States Y. Takei, ‘Assessing Flag State Performance in 
Legal Terms: Clarifications of the Margin of Discretion’, 28 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law (2013), 97-133.
21   ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC), Case No. 21 Advisory Opinion of 2 April 2015; at paras. 16-141.
22  ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, 
para. 197.
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On the one hand, in case of public vessels, it would be easier to establish 
the responsibility of the flag State for any omission to discharge this duty of 
due diligence. Due to the chain of command and control in public vessels, 
specifically warships and coastguard vessels usually involved in search and 
rescue operations, the flag State will be immediately and directly reported of 
the relevant incidents and thus the failure to investigate them further would, 
arguably, establish their responsibility in.  
On the other, in the case of private vessels, the flag State is not directly 
responsible for the actions of a master who neglects his duty, but may nonetheless 
incur international responsibility for not acting with due diligence and enquire 
into such incidents. Yet, the question that may reasonably be posed is how the 
flag State is supposed to know about these incidents. This is possible insofar 
as the shipmaster observes the duty to record any reason for failing to render 
assistance. Indeed, according to Chapter V, Regulation 33 of the 1974 Safety of 
Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS),23 which complements the LOSC, the master 
is required ‘to enter in the log-book the reason for failing to proceed to the 
assistance of the persons in distress … [and] to inform the appropriate search 
and rescue service accordingly’.24 This registration would allow the flag State 
to enquire into whether the master did discharge his or her duties and if not, to 
impose penalties according to its domestic legislation.25
With regard to coastal States, even though it is not within the ambit of the 
present contribution, article 98 (2) of LOSC stipulates:
‘Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance 
of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and 
over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional 
arrangements cooperate with neighboring States for this purpose’
 On the face of this provision, it is evident that LOSC postulates a general 
obligation on the part of coastal States to maintain search and rescue services as 
well as a general obligation of cooperation with other States to this end. The search 
and rescue regime under LOSC is complemented by the SOLAS Convention 
and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR 
Convention).26 The SAR Convention aims to create an international system for 
23  See International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, adopted 1 November 1974, entered 
into force 25 May 1980 (1184 U.N.T.S. No. 278); as at 20 January 2016 SOLAS had 162 contracting 
States; see at <http://www.imo.org/en/About/ Conventions/ Status Of Conventions/Documents/
Status%20-%202016.pdf> (accessed on 9 February 2016).
24   SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 33 (1).
25   See fn 24.
26   See International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, adopted 27 April 1979, entered 
into force 22 June 1985, (1405 UNTS No. 23489); as at 5 June 2015 SAR Convention had 105 
contracting States, see at <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/
Default.aspx> (last accessed 8 July 2015) [hereinafter: SAR Convention]
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coordinating rescue operations and guaranteeing their efficiency and safety. 
Contracting States are obliged to provide SAR services in the area under their 
responsibility and are invited to regulate and coordinate operations and rescue 
services in the maritime zone designated in the agreement.27 
In May 2004, in the wake of the infamous Tampa incident28 and the 
initiatives that it fuelled,29the SAR and SOLAS Conventions were amended to 
impose additional obligations upon the State parties, including an obligation on 
States to “cooperate and coordinate” to ensure that ships’ masters are allowed 
to disembark rescued persons to a place of safety:30 As recognized by the IMO 
Maritime Safety Committee, the intent of the amendments is to ensure that a 
place of safety is provided within a reasonable time. The primary responsibility 
to provide a place of safety or to ensure that a place of safety is provided rests 
with the Government responsible for the SAR region in which the survivors were 
recovered.31
The term ‘place of safety’ is defined neither by the SOLAS nor by the 
SAR Convention. The 2004 IMO Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued 
at Sea, define a ‘place of safety’ as any place where the survivors’ safety of life 
is no longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such as food, shelter 
and medical needs) can be met’.32 Whilst these guidelines are not themselves 
binding, they provide an important means for interpreting the obligations set 
forth in LOSC, SOLAS and the SAR Convention, since they may be considered 
27   See also SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 7 and S. Trevisanut, ‘Search and Rescue Operations 
in the Mediterranean: Factor of Cooperation or Conflict? 25 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law (2010), 523, at 524.
28   In August 2001, in response to an Australian-coordinated search and rescue operation, the 
Norwegian MV Tampa rescued 433 asylum seekers from a sinking Indonesian flagged vessel 75 
nautical miles off the Australian coast. When the Tampa began heading towards the Australian 
port of Christmas Island, the Australian authorities intercepted the vessel before entering; see the 
relevant discussion in C.M. Bostock, ‘The International Legal Obligation Owed to the Asylum-
Seekers on the M. V. Tampa’, 14 International Journal of Refugee Law (2002), 279.
29   See inter alia IMO Assembly Resolution on the Review of Safety Measures and Procedures for 
the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 22nd session, Agenda Item No. 8, IMO Assembly Res. 
A.920(22), November 2001 and UNHCR, ‘Note on International Protection’, 53rd session, UN 
doc.A/AC.96/965 (11 Sept. 2002).
30   Amendments to SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 33: IMO, MSC Res 153 (78), MSC Doc. 78/26.
add.1, Annex 5 (20 May 2004). The amendments entered into force 1 January 2006. They are 
binding upon all parties to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions, but for Malta, which opted out and 
thus it is not bound; see IMO, Status of multilateral Conventions and instruments in respect of which 
the  International Maritime Organization or its  Secretary-General performs depositary or other 
functions, at p. 42; available at <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/
Documents/Status%20-%202014.pdf>
31  See Article 4.1-1 of SOLAS and the Annex of SAR, paragraph 3.1.9. 
32   Resolution MSC. 167(78), adopted 20 May 2004; available at <http://docs.imo.org.>
38                                                                                       EFTHYMIOS D. PAPASTAVRIDIS
as subsequent practice under article 31 (3) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (1969).33
However, the aforementioned obligations do not explicitly stipulate that 
the State responsible for the SAR zone is obliged to disembark the survivors in 
its own territory. In other words, the formal treaty law does not oblige a coastal 
State to allow disembarkation on its own territory when it has not been possible 
to do so elsewhere. This has been criticized as the major shortcoming of the 
treaty regime.34 As a matter of policy this has as a consequence that the vessels 
rescuing migrants at sea do not have clear and foreseeable guidelines as to where 
are supposed to disembark these persons, as this would depend on the ad hoc 
cooperation of the competent coastal States. This amounts to a very significant 
impediment or disincentive for the main ‘users’ of the oceans, i.e. the private 
mariners,35 to discharge their traditional humanitarian duty. 
          2.  Human Rights Law
Obligations upon States concerning persons in distress at sea may arise, 
not only from the law of the sea, but also from international human rights law. 
In the context of rescue at sea, the human right of most immediate concern is the 
right to life, enshrined, amongst others, in article 2 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)36 and article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).37 As held by the European Court of Human Rights 
in Osman v United Kingdom (1999), article 2 requires states not only to refrain 
33   See article 31 (3) (b) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (opened for signature 
23 May 1969), 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter referred to as VCLT]. See also H Fox, ‘Article 31(3)
(A) and (B) of the Vienna Convention and the “Kasikili/Sedudu Island” case’, in M Fitzmaurice 
et al (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on 
(Leiden: Nijhoff, 2010) 59.
34   See further discussion in E. Papastavridis, We Saved them. Now What?: The Unresolved 
Question of Disembarkation of Rescued Persons at Sea’, in J.M. Sobrino Heradia (ed.), The 
contribution of the United Nations Conference of the Law of the See to good governance of the 
oceans and seas, 2 Vols., (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2014), pp. 615-635
35  On the term ‘users of the seas’ see Ε. Roucounas, ‘Effectiveness of International Law for the 
Users of the Seas’ in Jorge Cardona Llorens (ed.), Cursos euromediterráneos bancaja de derecho 
internacional, Vol. 8, (Valencia, 2009), 855-922.
36  ‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one  shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for 
which  this penalty is provided by law’ See article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR).
37  ‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’; see Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
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from causing death, but also to take positive measures to protect the lives of 
individuals within their jurisdiction.38 
Thus, flag States involved in rescue operations have to take all necessary 
measures to protect the lives of individuals in distress, provided, of course, that 
they are within their jurisdiction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction has been established 
for activities occurring on the high seas in a number of cases39, yet the exact 
scope of human rights treaties in relation to various situations of extraterritorial 
action remains contested.40 In the present milieu, it is questioned whether the 
master of the vessel rescuing migrants on the high seas are bound by human 
rights obligations, even though these acts do not take place in their territory. In 
other words, at which point are the persons in distress considered as subject to 
the jurisdiction of the States concerned?
Having in mind the prerequisite of authority and control as discussed 
both in the international case-law and theory, the following comments are in 
order: First, as regards flag States, it is doubtless that these persons brought 
onboard would come under the jurisdiction of the flag State of the rescuing State 
vessel.41 Human rights jurisdiction has also been established in cases where 
migrants do not come on board the rescuing vessel, but where there is a certain 
interference with the navigation of their vessel by a State vessel, like a coastguard 
vessel, in the context of immigration control.42 Arguably, from the moment that 
the coastguard vessel exercises such ‘de facto control’ over the navigation of 
a vessel carrying migrants, the latter persons come within the respective flag 
State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.
 On the contrary, the situation is different where rescue operations are 
conducted by private vessels. In such cases, a jurisdictional link between the 
rescued persons and the flag State can only be established where the master is 
given specific instructions from the competent authorities of the flag State as to 
how it should proceed with the persons concerned and acts accordingly. In that 
38   See Osman v United Kingdom Application No. 87/1997/871/1083, Grand Chamber Judgment 
of 28 October 1998, 29 EHRR 245. See also on the positive obligation dimension of this right 
Furdík v. Slovakia (Admissibility decision), Application no. 42994/05, 2 December 2008 and 
Kemaloglu v. Turkey, Application no. 19986/06, 10 April 2012.
39   See inter alia Hirsi Jamaa ao v Italy App. no 27765/09 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 
23 February 2012)and Medvedyev et al. v. France, judgment of 29 March 2010 (Grand Chamber, 
Application No. 3394/03).
40   See inter alia Hirsi Jamaa ao v Italy App. no 27765/09 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 
23 February 2012)and Medvedyev et al. v. France, judgment of 29 March 2010 (Grand Chamber, 
Application No. 3394/03).
41   See Hirsi Jamaa ao v Italy, case, para. 81 andMedvedyev et al. v. France, para 67
42   For cases of interception of vessels and the right to life see ECtHR, Xhavara and Others v Italy 
and Albania (Application No 39473/98), Admissibility Decision of 11 January 2001;Judgment of 
3 May 2009 as well as UN Committee against Torture, Sonko v. Spain (Comm. No. 368/2010), 
Decision of 20 February 2012
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case, arguably, the master becomes a de facto organ of the flag State under article 
8 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (ARSIWA), through which the flag State exercises jurisdiction over these 
persons.43 
 II.  International Responsibility Arising
 from Failure to Rescue Lives at Sea 
Having discussed the international obligations applicable to rescue-at-
sea, it is time to scrutinise the responsibility of flag States. Following the structure 
of Article 2 of the ARSIWA, I will examine both the element of the attribution of 
wrongful acts to the States and the element of breach of the relevant obligations.
Starting with States and the rules for the attribution of conduct, articles 
4-11 of the ARSIWA set forth the conditions under which conduct is attributed 
to the state for the purposes of determining its international responsibility.44 
In the present milieu, the conduct that should, in principle, be attributed to 
a State would be the non-rescue of persons in distress on the part of the flag 
State. Assuming that such conduct has occurred, the existence of a wrongful act 
would be contingent upon the attribution of the conduct in question to the State 
concerned.
With regard to the element of breach of international obligations, ‘there 
is a breach of an international obligation when conduct attributed to a State as a 
subject of international law amounts to a failure by that State to comply with an 
international obligation incumbent upon it…’.45 Nonetheless, as the International 
Law Commission explains, ‘[i]n determining whether given conduct attributable 
to a State constitutes a breach of its international obligations, the principal focus 
will be on the primary obligation concerned. It is this which has to be interpreted 
and applied to the situation, determining thereby the substance of the conduct 
required, the standard to be observed, the result to be achieved, etc’.46 In the 
present case, the primary obligations of States under LOSC, the relevant IMO 
Conventions and customary international law have been adequately determined 
43  See article 8 of ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, UN General Assembly Official Records; 56th Session, Supp. No. 10 at UN. Doc 
A/56/10; at 31 [hereinafter: ARSIWA]; http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ 
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. See also on persons acting on state ‘instructions’ J. Crawford, State 
Responsibility, The General Part (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 144-146.
44   See ASR Commentary, at 38. On the issue of attribution see inter alia L. Condorelli, ‘The 
Rules of Attribution: General Considerations’ in J. Crawford et al. (eds.), The Law of International 
Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 221.
45   ASR Commentary, at 54.
46   Ibid.
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and construed in the previous section. Therefore, the following enquiry will 
focus on whether the attribution of the conduct in question to either the flag 
or the coastal State establishes an internationally wrongful act and thus the 
international responsibility of these States. 
As regards the requisite element of attribution to the flag State, the fact 
that a vessel flying the flag of a particular State has failed to render assistance 
to persons in distress at sea could be attributable to the latter State in a number 
of cases. On the one hand, if the vessel in question is a warship or other duly 
designated State vessel, the master, with which the pertinent duty lies, is a de 
jure organ of a State and thus his or her conduct is attributable to the flag State 
pursuant to article 4 of ARSIWA.47 This does not mean however that in each 
and every case this omission would entail the responsibility of the flag State, as 
this omission must also amount to a violation of article 98 (1) of LOSC and the 
concomitant due diligence obligation of the flag State as well as a violation of the 
right to life under human rights law. On the other hand, if the vessel in question 
is private, the attribution to the flag State is not so obvious, in the sense that the 
master of the vessel is not a de jure organ of the State. However, there are other 
rules of attribution, which might be applicable here.
Pursuant to article 5 of ARSIWA:
‘[t]he conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under 
article 4, but which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements 
of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the 
particular instance’.
Hypothetically, should the flag State have explicitly authorised the 
master of the vessel to exercise ‘elements of governmental authority’ in this 
regard, then the conduct of the non-rescue of migrants could be attributed to 
the State. Indeed, flag States often empower masters with certain public powers, 
such as the power to arrest on board the vessel.48 However, it is the view of the 
author that such delegation of authority cannot exist in respect of rescue-at-sea. 
And the reason is not that the criterion of ‘empowerment by law’ is not met: quite 
to contrary, flag States do provide in their domestic legislation for the duty of the 
master to perform search and rescue activities; this is not a prerogative of the flag 
States, but, as said, their obligation pursuant to article 98 (1) of LOSC.   
47   On the question of responsibility of flag States for acts or omissions of their state vessels, see P. 
Mallia, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security through the 
Creation of a Cooperative Framework (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 105.
48  See e.g. Section 105 of the UK Merchant Shipping Act, 1995: ‘The master of any United 
Kingdom ship may cause any person on board the ship to be put under restraint if and for so long 
as it appears to him necessary or expedient in the interest of safety or for the preservation of good 
order or discipline on board the ship’; available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/21/
section/105>
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The reason is simply that there is no delegation of ‘elements of governmental 
authority’. According to the International Law Commission:
‘[t]he justification for attributing to the State under international law the 
conduct of “parastatal” entities lies in the fact that the internal law of the State 
has conferred on the entity in question the exercise of certain elements of the 
governmental authority. If it is to be regarded as an act of the State for purposes 
of international responsibility, the conduct of an entity must accordingly concern 
governmental activity and not other private or commercial activity in which the 
entity may engage’.49 
Evidently, rendering assistance to persons in distress at sea constitutes neither 
‘governmental activity’, nor ‘private or commercial activity’, albeit a traditional 
maritime and ‘humanitarian’ duty par excellence, which, under international 
law, falls upon the master of any vessel to discharge. Accordingly, the conduct of 
private vessels should not, in principle, be attributed to the flag State according 
to article 5 of ARSIWA.
However, under article 8 of ARSIWA,
‘the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct’.50 
On the face of this provision, it can tenably be argued that should the flag 
State instruct the master of the vessel flying its flag to turn a blind eye to persons 
in distress at sea and the master comply with this instruction, this omission would 
be attributable to the flag state.
On the other hand, even if the conduct of the master of the private vessel 
is considered to be attributable to the flag State, this does not ipso facto entail 
that the latter incurs international responsibility. The conduct in question must 
also give rise to a breach of the relevant international obligation, pursuant to 
article 2 of ASR. Accordingly, it might be the case that the vessel in question 
did not proceed to the rescue of the persons in distress, because it was unable or 
considered it unnecessary, yet it informed the rescue authorities pursuant to the 
relevant regulations.51 This would not amount to a breach of the obligations of 
the flag State. 
In any case, the flag States involved may incur responsibility not for 
the failure to assist the persons at sea, but for not exercising the due diligence 
obligation provided for in articles 98 (1) of the LOSC and the SOLAS Convention. 
49   ARSIWA Commentary, at 43 (emphasis added).
50  See ASR Commentary, at 47. On ‘de facto organs’ of States see also Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 404 et seq.
51   See Regulation 33, Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention
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Thus, if there is a pattern of incidents of private vessels ignoring people in 
distress without registering ‘in the log-book the reason for failing to proceed to 
the assistance of the persons in distress’ or informing ‘the appropriate search and 
rescue service accordingly’ and the flag State remains idle, then there are good 
reasons to assert that the flag state has breached its due diligence obligations 
under the LOSC and the SOLAS Convention.
As regards the responsibility for violations of human rights law, it is 
contended that very exceptionally, and only in the case that the flag States had 
been informed about the boat in distress and had instructed their vessels not to 
render assistance, would the persons have been within  the ‘jurisdiction’ of those 
States. In such a case, the master may be considered as a ‘de facto organ’ in 
under article 8 of ARSWA and thus the failure to render assistance can be been 
attributed to the flag State. Consequently, the responsibility of the latter for the 
violation of the right to life might have arisen. Nevertheless, it is not the usual 
practice for commercial shipping to inform flag State authorities in respect of 
such matters nor for flag states authorities to instruct private vessels to ignore the 
obligation to render assistance. 
At this juncture, it is instructive to consider the left-to-die incident of 
March 2011. According to the available information, the boat in distress had 
been initially assisted by a military helicopter (there have been reports that it was 
Italian52) while it had encountered two fishing boats, one flying an Italian flag 
and the other a Tunisian flag, neither of which rendered assistance.53 In addition, 
three warships allegedly were in the vicinity: the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez 
(11 miles away), the Italian ITS Borsini (37 miles away)54 and a French vessel.55 
None of them assisted the boat people. 
In applying the rules on State responsibility, we can make a number of 
assertions. First of all, as regards the military helicopter, its presence and the 
initial assistance provided to the persons in distress brought about the result that 
these persons were under the personal control, and, hence, under the jurisdiction 
of the State of the registry of the helicopter. The omission to provide any further 
assistance was clearly attributed to that State, and constituted a breach of the 
positive obligation set forth by the right to life under article 2 of ECHR and 
article 6 of ICCPR. In addition, the state of registry of the helicopter may also 
incur responsibility for the lack of cooperation with other naval and aerial assets 
in the region so as to provide the assistance required to the persons in distress.
Secondly, with respect to the other military vessels, it seems difficult to 
sustain the argument that the flag States of the Méndez Núñez and the ITS Borsini 
52  See PACE Report, at para 28.
53  See ibid, at paras 36-38.
54  See ibid, at para 8.
55  Ibid, at paras 85-57
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had exercised any kind of ‘control’ over the persons on the boat so as to bring 
about the relevant human rights obligations. A distress call to all vessels in a wide 
area does not establish ‘jurisdiction’ of all flag States over the persons concerned. 
Nor, it can be said that the non-assistance as such infringed the applicable rules 
of the law of the sea. The only obligation of the flag States concerned was to 
discharge a posteriori their duty of due diligence, as analyzed above, which, 
however, presupposes the awareness of the incident and the reasons of the failure 
assist. In view of the location of these two warships and their parallel mandate 
under Operation Unified Protector in Libya, but more importantly, the lack of 
definite knowledge whether they indeed received the distress signal it is difficult 
to make such claim. 
However, the situation is different in relation to the other probably 
French- military- vessel: allegedly, this vessel had visual contact with the ‘boat 
people’, it was aware of the situation, namely that people, amongst them, children, 
had already died, and, nonetheless, it did not provide assistance.56 Arguably, 
the visual contact and the awareness of the situation triggered its obligation to 
provide assistance in accordance with the law of the sea; the failure to do so and 
the lack of any reporting to the responsible Rescue Coordination Center as well 
as, allegedly, the lack of any act in due diligence of the flag State of the warship 
may bring about the latter’s responsibility for not abiding by the pertinent rules 
under the law of the sea.
As per any human rights violation, firstly, it must be established that 
the ‘boat people’ were under the jurisdiction of the (unknown) flag State of 
the military vessel. This would require the extension of the ‘personal control’ 
model to the extent that any such encounter would bring about the ‘positive 
obligation’ to ensure the right to life in keeping with the Osman v. Uk case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights.57 Even though this argument might appear 
far-fetched in other contexts and not in accordance, for example, with the premise 
that positive obligations require certain control over a specific territory,58 it is 
submitted that due to the nature of the high seas as an area over which only the 
flag State may exercise jurisdiction under international law,59 it is inevitable that 
this jurisdiction would extent to such distress situations. This is also the raison 
d’être of article 98 (1) of LOSC, which explicitly calls for the assertion of such 
jurisdiction on the high seas on the part of the flag States. In other words, it is the 
jurisdiction that flag States are called to exercise on the high seas, including the 
jurisdiction to exercise due diligence control over their vessels, that informs also 
56   Ibid, at paras. 41-43.
57   See above n 37 and accompanying text.
58   See M. Milanovic, above n 39.
59   See article 92 of LOSC. On the nature of the high seas see E. Papastavridis ‘The Right of Visit 
on the High Seas in a Theoretical Perspective: Mare Liberum v. Mare Clausum Revisited’, 24 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2011), 45, at 52-53.
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the extent of their ‘jurisdictional reach’ in the same area for the purposes of the 
application of human rights treaties.
Consequently, it is the view of the author that in the context of the present 
enquiry, the ‘boat people’ in distress may come within the jurisdiction of the flag 
State of the warship, which is aware of their situation and has the due diligence 
obligation or a ‘best efforts’ obligation to secure their lives. Needless to say, any 
failure to assist them is directly attributed to the flag State, since they are state 
organs, and may amount to a breach of article 2 of ECHR or article 6 of ICCPR.
Thirdly, as to the responsibility of the flag States of the private vessels, that, 
allegedly, failed to render assistance, it is submitted that the omission as such 
cannot be attributed to the respective States, in casu, Italy, Tunisia and Cyprus 
and thus no responsibility for a violation of the right to life can be incurred. 
Only the lack of due diligence ex post facto by the said States may give rise to 
their responsibility for the violation of article 98 (1) of LOSC and the SOLAS 
Convention.  
 III.  Concluding Remarks: A Way Forward
 The recent incidents in the Mediterranean Sea as well as the current 
ones in the Aegean Sea reveal the inadequacies, the lack of resources or even 
the inertia of a number of actors (States, international organizations, private 
mariners) to rescue people in distress at sea. Indeed, an incredible number of 
silent tragedies occur every year in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the main 
efforts of the States concerned are directed towards securing their borders rather 
than saving people’s lives. Even in the aftermath of the more recent death of 
more than 700 people in the central Mediterranean (April 2015), States and 
the international community do not seem to be ready to seriously address this 
scourge.60
 The present enquiry focused on the issue of responsibility of flag States 
that may arise from the failure to save lives-at-sea. As it has become apparent 
from the discussion of the responsibility questions in cases of non-rescue at 
sea, many States ‘share’ the international responsibility for not meeting their 
obligations in this regard. Even though the legal framework is not perfectly 
adequate, this is no excuse for this inertia of all the relevant ‘stakeholders’. It is 
sad but true that the ‘dark side of globalization is manifesting itself in the seas 
and coasts of the Mediterranean. 
60   On the reactions to the EU Council Conclusions see inter alia Cathryn Costello and Mariagiulia 
Giuffré, Drowning Refugees, Migrants, and Shame at Sea: The EU’s Response’ Parts 1 and 2 
(27 April 2015); available at <http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/drowning-refugees-migrants-and-shame-
at-sea-the-eus-response-part-i/> and <http://ohrh.law.ox. ac. uk / drowning-refugees-migrants-and-
shame-at-sea-the-eu-response-part-ii/ >
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 To counter this, the key rests with the private mariners and their flag 
States. Truly, there has been a plethora of private stakeholders, be it in individual 
cases or in a more organized fashion61 that have rendered assistance to people at 
sea and keep doing so. Nevertheless, this does not suffice; since the sad reality 
is that very often private mariners turn a blind eye to situations of distress, while 
their flag States fail to exercise any monitoring of these omissions. However, 
their role is crucial as the number of private vessels traversing the seas is far more 
than this of the state vessels, even if all were to be deployed in rescue operations 
in the Mediterranean Sea. How then will they be more actively involved in such 
operations?
 As it was contended above, the most significant reason for the inertia 
of the private mariners is the lack of clarity as to the place of disembarkation of 
the rescued persons. It is thus imperative to assure the mariners that when they 
discharge their duty of rescue at sea, they will be able to disembark the persons 
concerned in a place of safety as swiftly as possible. This is also explicitly 
stipulated in Article 4.1-1 of SOLAS:
‘Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that masters 
of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released 
from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ship’s intended 
voyage, provided that releasing the master of the ship from the obligations under 
the current regulation does not further endanger the safety of life at sea’.62
 This would be feasible if the coastal States in whose SAR zone the 
rescue took place do cooperate directly with the master of the rescuing vessel or 
with its flag State as to the place of disembarkation. Additionally, it is proposed 
that each coastal State could have ex ante designated ports of disembarkation of 
rescued migrants analogous to places of refuge for ships in need of assistance 
due to accidents.63 Thus the vessels concerned would be certain that their voyage 
will not be overly delayed, since they would know where exactly to go in cases 
of rescue-at-sea to disembark the rescued people. The latter would serve as an 
incentive to private mariners to fully discharge their humanitarian duties.
Having said that, it should be underscored that the flag States do have 
an obligation of due diligence in relation to the rescue duties of the Masters of 
vessels flying their flags as well as an obligation of cooperation with other States, 
61   See e.g. the commendable concentrated efforts of Migrants Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) 
at <https://www.moas.eu/mitigating-death-and-inspiring-action-at-the-worlds-deadliest-border-
moas-saves-10000-lives-during-its-first-year/>
62   See supra n. 22 (emphasis added).
63   IMO, Resolution A.949(23), ‘Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance’, 
A 23/Res.949, 5 March 2004. Under the Guidelines, ‘ships in need of assistance’ are deemed as: 
‘a ship in a situation, apart from one requiring rescue of persons on board, that could give rise to 
loss of the vessel or an environmental or navigational hazard’ (para. 1.18). The 2003 Guidelines 
were complemented by the ‘Guidelines on the Control of Ships in an Emergency’ adopted on 19 
October 2007, MSC.1/Circ.1251.
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including the responsible SAR coastal States. It is our firm belief that only if 
all States live up to their obligation and the shipping industry is more actively 
involved in rescue operations the ongoing death toll at sea would significantly 
decrease. 
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 I.  Introduction
Western Balkans (WB) has traditionally been a region prone to migration 
flows. The recent history and the global trends label this part of Europe as transit 
region, and in some limited cases, a destination area. The dramatic process of 
political transitions, the war and the post conflict situation on the Western Balkans, 
amplified with the breakdown of Yugoslavia, is influencing the current processes 
of democratization. WB is surrounded by the EU countries and the migration 
flows are affecting the region with the same challenges and risks, as the EU. 
On the other hand, the WB countries have their national mechanisms (usually 
very limited) in managing the migration processes (including the irregular 
migration and the related organized crime modalities). The regional response 
is always a demanding issue, specifically during the increased migration flows, 
when hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants are traveling through the 
Western Balkans.
 II.  Migration phenomenon tendencies
 Speaking of the migration, two forces are making dialectic unity: 
a) The world will continue to become even mobile; the people will travel;
1   Trpe Stojanovski is full professor at the University “St. Kliment Ohridski”.
2   Aleksandar Stojanovski is a Ph.D. candidat at the Faculty of security, University “St. Kliment 
Ohridtski” – Bitola. 
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b) The world will become more confronted and a more dangerous place. In 
that sense, the crime forms linked with migration will bring about new modus 
operandi, specifically in the case when such unprecedented migration flows take 
place. The 2015 migration and refugee exodus present new set of modalities of 
smuggling migrants through sea and land. 
There is a huge number of irregular entrees made by migrants and 
refugees who reach the coasts of South East Europe with the goal to enter the 
EU. Most of them try to escape armed conflicts and violence in Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Eritrea and Somalia, by entering Italy and continuing further into 
the whole Schengen area or first enter Greece and then, continue to the main 
Schengen area through Macedonia and Serbia, by entering Hungary, or Croatia, 
Slovenia and after that, continuing to Austria and Germany. The most illegal 
border crossings took place in 2015, which is more than in 2012 and during the 
Arab Spring in 2011. 
The irregular migrants and refugees arrive by boats guided by traffickers 
and a lot of them lose their lives at sea. Significant number of them have never 
before seen salt water. There are numerous reasons for such intensive influx of 
human beings and refugees on their journey to Europe. The first is humanitarian, 
natural reaction to escape from the war torn areas and to search for a safe place 
for life. There are also migrants who are not forced to move, but their motivation 
is to get in Europe, where the living conditions are better than those of their 
places of origin. They intend their migration movement to be justified with 
the refugee exodus, they have calculated the moment in time, as well as the 
route of travel as an opportunity for easier access to their destination. Beside 
the exodus, there are criminal groups which have their own calculations and 
ways of making enormous profits, mostly on the tragedies of their “customers” 
and their discriminated role during their movement. They are well organized 
in knowing the circumstances in the countries of origin, transit and destination 
countries, they are well connected with the criminal groups from other countries 
on the migration route. One of the open issues in more efficient prevention and 
combating the transnational organized crime related to the migration are: finding 
separate legal solutions, which are based on the international instruments, whose 
implementation might differ in some cases, depending on the national traditions, 
culture and other specifics. Another interesting point is the absence of efficient 
legal solutions in the international instruments for preventing and sentencing 
of crimes connected with smuggling of migrants on the international seas. This 
situation is reflected in the national legislature, and the organized criminal groups 
are aware of this fact.
The national response on the migration flows is determined by number 
of specifics of the countries, their geographical location, configuration, national 
capacities, potentials of the state institutions to manage inter and intra institutional 
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cooperation, ability to focus on the crises, trained staff to deal with migrants 
and refuges in such high numbers as never before, lack of sufficient logistical 
capacities, lack of financial support by the donors which remains critical, due to 
the fact that in the current crises the Western Balkan countries have managed the 
process with their national budgets.  
However, the refugee crises highlighted several aspects for the countries 
directly affected with the migration flows. Non-EU countries react individually, 
following their national strategies and action plans, which were prepared in 
different, more regular circumstances. One of the crucial issue was lack of 
the bilateral and even more – regional cooperation. The first instance of such 
unprecedented issue was the border between Greece and Macedonia, which is 
external EU border, where the Greek authorities decline to remain in contact 
with the neighbouring authorities due to the political issue related with the name 
Macedonia, while stating that they have more difficulties on the border with 
Turkey as well as throughout the country, and because of that, they are not able 
to be more present on their northern border. In such situation, when there is no 
exchange of valuable information by the neighbouring country Greece, which 
represents the EU, when 5-12.000 human beings per day are appearing on the 
wide horizon, when this exodus was not properly recognized, the Macedonian 
society faced a lot of challenges and improvisation. 
Some of these challenges are in the area of internal potentials to react 
properly, mostly because of ignoring the unfolding scenario and the rising need 
to prepare reception centers on time near the border, also, mostly because of the 
very limited transport potentials and other kind of services which the country 
is obliged to offer for such enormous number of refugees and migrants. The 
issue of the regular border control is another problem which became evident in 
the circumstances which seemed like improvisation rather than border check. 
Another issue which brought confusion and confrontation was the position of the 
NGO sector who enabled some services to be offered to the humanitarian efforts 
aimed at helping the refugees as victims who have endured a long trip, strenuous 
conditions, a lot of prejudices, etc. On the other hand, the state authorities at the 
beginning were focusing to mobilize their potentials in better border control, 
better migration management and better repose to the migrants and refugees who 
are moving from Greece to Macedonia, and their transport to the north, to Serbia. 
The main challenge was to divide the efforts and streamline the approach: the 
state authorities were dominantly focused on state security; and the civil society 
was focused only on the human security.
In the whole Western Balkans, the role of the civil society in the 
migration exodus is marked as very proactive, service oriented, aimed at 
mobilizing the citizens to help in collecting the goods, offering of assistance to 
the refuges, specifically to the vulnerable groups. The NGOs were present on the 
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border crossing points, assisting in facilitation the accommodation, translation, 
medical and other services for the migrants and refugees. They present better 
performances compared with the state authorities; also they have put pressure on 
the state authorities to improve their services and to be more sensitive regarding 
the migrants. Very positive attitude by the civil society is noted in networking the 
NGOs from all countries from South-East Europe, by exchanging the information 
on the migration flows, sharing the experiences and identifying the denominator 
for common activities.
In the autumn 2015 the RCC Secretary General stated that the WB 
states are not able to manage the current crises on their territory, separately. 
This statement was made early in the beginning by the experts after a conducted 
analysts, and further it was reaffirmed by the national leaders from the Western 
Balkan countries. They intended to be part of the European migration policy, 
but in the reality such policy doesn’t exist (up to 1st November, ’15). Even 
more, the Dublin agreement is not functional in such a migration exodus and 
the reaction by the EU authorities regarding the asylum policy was frequently 
unclear, the conclusions for the readiness to accept refuges quite often was 
restructured (and it will continue to work in such trajectory, for while). Some 
EU member states from the eastern part were very restrictive and unpleasant in 
regard to the possibility the refuges, mostly Muslims to come in their countries 
and have created negative campaigns and voicing their refusal for their territory 
to be used by the refuges and migrants. Starting from August, ’15 the Hungarian 
authorities have built a perimeter on the green border with Serbia, which on 15th 
of September, 2015 is officially introduced as “forbidden land” for the migration 
flows. Under such circumstances, the migrants and the refugees were forced to 
redirect their movement through Croatia. Such a situation has brought tension 
between Croatian authorities, who are in an election campaign period and the 
Serbian government, mostly due to the number of refugees who crossed from 
Serbia into Croatia in the numbers upward of 5000 individuals and more in 24 
hours, and the statement by the Croatian authorities that they are able to manage 
the process of 3-4000 migrants and refuges daily. This scenario had caused a 
spiral of mutual blaming which introduced an embargo for traveling imposed 
on the Serbian vehicles and goods to Croatia, and some countermeasures which 
were introduced from Serbia at Croatia. After six days of tensions, the Croats 
ceased the embargo. In some cases, the Croatian authorities also organized lift of 
the migrants to Hungary with buses and trains. Such scenario was seen as a bad 
attitude toward Hungary by the Croatians and the train ended up being captured 
by the Hungarians3. Another important issue is that Hungarians extended their 
perimeter on the border line with Croatia to prevent further movements of 
3   During the visit of Croatian President, Ms. Grabar Kitarovic to Hungary, in October, 2015 there 
was statement on Al Jazera that both states reach the agreement for turning back the train.
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migrants from Croatia to their territory. This is a very sensitive issue from the 
perspective of the EU, having in mind that this “wall” is established inside the 
European Union, which as an occurrence is against their [EU] philosophy and 
goals. The intention was made public through the media, that Hungary is going 
to extend its perimeter with Slovenia, which would disqualify the Schengen 
values, but such process has not commenced yet.
When the migrants and refugees arrived on the Croatian – Slovenian 
border, again the nervousness became evident. This time in the way that the 
Croats voiced their willingness to allow to the people fleeing conflict to live their 
country while the Slovenians pushed for control of the number of migrants and 
refugees entering in Slovenia and insisted on having smaller number of those 
persons. Regardless of the fact that in this case both countries are EU members, 
the authorities wanted to maintain regular border control and management as 
much as possible. This scenario was evident even when the migrants moved 
from Slovenia to Austria. Both countries are members of Schengen, but now the 
police was present on the border line, trying to separate the migration waves and 
to allow to the people to pass the border in periodically divided time portions. 
When the response of the law enforcement services was less than what the 
authorities have hoped for, the migrants and refugees dictated the development 
of the scenario and they usually demonstrated pressure for passing the barriers 
and moving further.
Most of the countries had no proper plan for this kind of phenomenon. 
Some of them, including Macedonia, because of the delayed reaction, worked 
on the scenario while the exodus was in full swing. Cases in which the police 
was in the first line to manage the border line protection emerged, while it had 
to maintain the peace and order. In some cases the police behaviour was not 
appropriate with regard to the situation on the field, thus, the police powers were 
enforced too extensively. The other countries, specifically those which were 
not on the migration route in the first moment, like Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina – were able to learn from the experience of 
Macedonia and Serbia and to mobilize their potentials. After Hungary developed 
the perimeter on the border with Serbia, the migration flows redirected to Croatia 
and Slovenia, on its way to Germany, via Austria. 
Since the beginning of the increased migration flows in June 2015, it 
is evident that the cooperation between the southeast European countries has 
some positive examples, like the cooperation between Macedonia and Serbia, 
and cooperation under tensions between Serbia and Hungary, Serbia and Croatia 
(which culminated with sanctions in transport between the traffic and goods for 
the companies from both countries for the period of several days), Croatia and 
Slovenia and in October, ’15 between Slovenia and Austria. The most vulnerable 
border in this part of Europe is Greek-Macedonian border, where there was no 
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communication between the police forces, because of the ignorant position by 
Greece (during the exodus there are contacts between the regular police forces 
from both sides, however only on the technical level). After the meeting on 25th 
of October, 2015 in Brussels4 initiated by the European Union and the leaders 
of 11 European countries affected with the migration route, the plan with 17 
items is endorsed, which should strengthen the further cooperation between 
the authorities. The main message of this event is concentrated in Mr. Junker’s 
statement: “Countries affected should not only talk about and at each other 
but also with each other. Neighbours should work together not against each 
other. Refugees need to be treated in a humane manner along the length of the 
Western Balkans route to avoid a humanitarian tragedy in Europe. I am therefore 
pleased that today we were able to jointly agree on a 17-point plan of pragmatic 
and operational measures to ensure people are not left to fend for themselves 
in the rain and cold.”5. At this important event, the current and the future EU 
Presidency representatives were present, Luxemburg and the Netherlands, as 
well as the heads of FRONTEX and UNHCR, as the relevant representatives 
for international cooperation with the migrants, who should strengthen, and 
contribute in coordination and improvement of the national, bilateral, regional 
and wider cooperation.
 III.  Regional Cooperation on the Balkans in the field of security
There are several grounds for making the regional cooperation in the 
field of security a challenge of today perception of state sovereignty; legally 
determined police cooperation; other law enforcement agencies cooperation; 
convergence through regional trainings; cultural diversity in the region; language 
as a barrier or understanding; combating organized crime demands police 
cooperation.
The Regional police cooperation as part of the international policing is 
becoming more challenging and demanding issue for modern policing. It is based 
on timely sharing of information and is serving as a fundament for the more 
integrated regional police cooperation. The story of regional police cooperation 
becomes more challenging when the Western Balkans region is analysed more 
closely, having in mind the (recent) history of this region, the current balance of 
power of the member states; the affiliation of some WB countries with the EU and 
the rest of them, which are close, or not as close in its EU journey. Definitely, the 
new extraordinary challenge is the migration flow passing through the Balkans 
towards the EU countries, mostly Germany as a final destination, in figures never 
4   http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5904_en.htm
5   http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5904_en.htm
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seen before. In 2014, in the EU 282.000 migrants and refugees have arrived, 
while, in 9 months of 2015 there are 710.000 migrants and refugees registered.6 
This challenge and the modalities of its migration forms are seen as the test 
of the existing regional and international police cooperation in extraordinary 
circumstances.
 The Regional police/law enforcement cooperation on the WB is 
progressing in a number of fields. One is throughout the MARRI Initiative, more 
precisely, focusing on the MARRI Projects  and through the MARRI Networks: 
a) Airports Police Commanders, b) National Coordinators for Trafficking in 
Human Beings, c) Heads for Asylum and d) Irregular migration/ Readmission 
(see: www.marri-rc.org).
 For the purposes of the EU-funded - FP7 Project titled COMPOSITE 
(www.composite-project.eu) an evaluation of the regional police cooperation 
between the border police forces at the above mentioned airports was conducted. 
In late 2013, a questionnaire was designed and data collection was performed. 
The aim of the questionnaire was to perform in depth analysis so to evaluate the 
level of cooperation established as well as to assess further needs in reaching the 
EU standards. 
 This analysis employs the results of the data collection performed on 
37 respondents, all police officers, in respect to the regional police cooperation 
among border police organizations operating at these airports, conducted by the 
MARRI-RC.
The analysis of the regional police cooperation in the WB region has been 
motivated by the identified characteristics7, which makes it worthy of scrutiny in 
its own geographical and social context. These characteristics include:
A. There are persistent feelings for the state sovereignty, which was a strong 
factor for the state security in the previous political system and until 
recently (end of the last century) the bilateral and regional cooperation 
was limited to symbolic, rather than intensive police cooperation. Today 
the MARRI Member States (MS) as independent states are members 
of international law enforcement agencies. After the dissolution of 
the former Yugoslavia and the transformation from totalitarian to 
democratic societies, the newly independent states became members 
of associations, initiatives, mutual centers and networks established to 
speed up the law enforcement cooperation based on mutual trust. 
6   Source: Frontex, Al Jezera 18 October, 2015
7   FP 7 Project Composite www.composite-project.eu, Title of the Macedonian Targeted Study: 
Changes in MARRI Regional Centre in Skopje (Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative), 
Trpe Stojanovskiab, Stojanka Mircevaa, Katerina Krstevskaa, Rade Rajkovcevskia, Toni Jakimovskib 
aFaculty of Security - Skopje, University “St. Kliment Ohridski” - Bitola (Republic of Macedonia), 
bMARRI Regional Centre in Skopje (2013)
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B. The modalities for regional police cooperation are based on both 
national law and international instruments, which are recognized as sine 
qua non for prevention and fight against transnational organized crime. 
The modalities for cooperation are already established, however, there 
is room for further improvements. 
C. The regional trainings are of high importance due to the fact that they 
are effective forums in which the police officers from the neighboring 
countries are seeking for regional solutions to regional challenges. 
D. The cultural differences are evident even in the majority of the countries 
which were in the same state (Yugoslavia). Such cultural differences 
cumulated with separate historical differences are even stronger with the 
states which were not a part of a former larger entity such as Yugoslavia. 
E. The different languages spoken in the region (even though most languages 
belong to the Slavic group) affect the communication and therefore are 
recognized as a barrier. Following the standards of International Law, 
English is introduced as official language of the regional initiatives 
and the main language for the multilateral communications. However, 
language is still a substantial barrier in mutual understanding, sharing 
of information between the police services and building confidence, 
which thwart the fluent cooperation. 
F. The institutional relations between the national police forces and the 
regional organizations are fairly new, established roughly 15 years 
ago, as a new reality for prevention and fighting the cross border 
organized crime. The new paradigm for the regional organizations was 
extensively supported by the USA and the EU institutions by assisting 
the authorities in the WB (and other geographical regions, where the 
transformation from totalitarian system to democracy was established) 
to work together on the security, in order to build the confidence and 
improve the performance in common activities. Information sharing 
in a safe and professional manner is the most essential approach. On 
the other hand, the performances of national police services, their 
expectations and support to the regional organizations differ from state 
to state. However, the crucial moment is that the political support is 
evident, which keeps the room for more professional developments 
between the national police and the regional organization. 
Additionally, the present migration phenomenon throughout Europe is, 
at least to some extent, historically determined. Modern history offers clues for 
many similarities and contrasts between countries and regions. For instance, 
many differences in current population movements in Europe are due to differing 
times of initiation and courses of modernization. By the same token, it is no 
MIGRATION AND ITS SECURITY ASPECTS ON THE WESTERN BALKANS                                                                    57
wonder that current migration in South East Europe is influenced by a more 
recent history of political isolation and forcibly repressed spatial mobility.8
Distinct migration trends in South East Europe are attributable less to 
political developments of the second half of the 20th century than to historical 
factors, of which the following four seem to be prominent:9
- Relative economic and institutional backwardness (compared to the West);
- Relative abundance of labour;
- Relative instability of state boundaries;
- Relative instability of a (comparatively diverse) ethnic mix in the population.
 IV.  Importance of the Regional Cooperation
The Regional cooperation represents the common interest of all countries 
of the region and its intensification has already given concrete positive effects in 
the sense of renewal and further development of partnership and strengthening 
of mutual trust.10 
Integration process with the EU is considered to be the strategic 
commitment of the region and it is carried out throughout dynamic reform 
process of the Law Enforcement. According to the priorities defined by the WB 
governments, essential attention is directed to the quality and intensification of 
regional and international cooperation. Regional initiatives are guiding activities 
intended for enhancement of cooperation among the Law Enforcement and 
Administrative organizations of the WB countries, by establishing mechanisms 
to tackle all forms of crime as well as contribute to strengthening bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in the field of security. 
Implementation of activities carried out by regional initiatives is entailed 
during pre-accession negotiations with the EU, aiming at determining and defining 
direction of association in order to decrease security risks and challenges. 
In the last decade, the police organizations have acquired a fully-fledged 
membership to number of significant European and world Law Enforcement 
structures as well as international organizations and have signed bilateral and 
multilateral agreement on police cooperation, which absolutely provides addition 
impetus to reaching standards of modern policing. It is important to note that the 
countries of the region are enjoying high quality support from the EU, diplomatic 
representative offices and other relevant international subjects.
8 http://www.un.org/esa/population/migration/turin/Symposium_Turin_files/P12_Kaczmarczyk 
%26Okolski.pdf
9     Okólski, M. (2004). Migration trends in Central and Eastern Europe on the eve of the European 
Union enlargement: an overview. In Migration in the New Europe: East-West Revisited, Gorny A., 
P. Ruspini eds. Houndmills/Basingstoke/Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 23-48
10   More about this issue in: Stojanovski, Mehovic, Stojanovski, Regional Police Cooperation in 
South East Europe through the MARRI Initiative, Crossroads 2015, Vol 4, No.2
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In the process of strengthening cooperation at bilateral level the 
countries of the region are delegating Law Enforcement representatives to 
different European countries and to regional and international organizations, in 
order to enable direct communication on different points of interest, also through 
cooperation they are creating the joint investigative teams, running synchronized 
investigations and promptly exchanging information. 
Regional initiatives are tasked to assist countries in organizing trainings 
for Law Enforcement officers, carry out cooperation with international partners 
and European Commission, implementing IPA projects, arranging expert and 
financial support, aiming to contribute to strengthening of administrative and 
operative capacities in the fight against all forms of serious crime. Also, regional 
initiatives are conducting various analyses and producing assessments of project 
implementation efficiency, focusing mainly in project sustainability.
The aim of all projects with the regional approach is to assist enhancement 
and further promotion of strategic and operational regional cooperation.
WB countries are supporting the creation of joint teams, as a mechanism 
enabling efficient fight against all forms of transnational & trans-border crime. 
The legal ground for joint teams operation is based on the PCC SEE (Police 
Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe) and the work is focused on 
concrete operative proceedings of the law enforcement agencies of the signatory 
countries.
Beside the activities and progress done in the field of regional cooperation 
and partnership, during the current migration crises there is no presence of the 
existing regional entities. Regional Cooperation Council, Migration, Asylum, 
Refugee Regional Initiative don’t come to the public with any initiative or 
activities. That is a sign that the frame of the migration exodus is too high. The 
most present international organizations present on the field are FRONTEX and 
UNCHR, who are able to be present, to survive and to take some actions on the 
field.
 V.  MARRI Initiative 
The Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) is 
formed in 2003 within the milieu of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe by 
merging the Regional Return Initiative - RRI and the Migration and Asylum 
Initiative - MAI. Since April 2004, MARRI has been within the framework of 
the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). MARRI deals with the 
issue of population movements within the area of WB. The MARRI Member 
States are: Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia, 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Republic of Serbia. Each country has 
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its state official in the MARRI RC; four of them are with police and two are 
with diplomatic background. MARRI RC has no law enforcement performances. 
The MARRI Regional Forum, which is the steering body of the initiative and 
is composed of the ministers of Interior from the six MS, has a meeting at least 
once per year. Representatives from international partner organizations and donor 
countries are also invited to attend. The Regional Forum acts as a platform for 
coordination among the member countries and for consultation with its partners. 
The initiative is led by a Presidency, which is held by one of the member countries 
on a rotating basis. The current Presidency is led by Montenegro (2015/2016), 
which will be followed by Albania.
The one of the aspirations of the RC was to facilitate and strengthen the 
ownership of the regional cooperation. Today the Initiative is able to identify 
regional priorities, important from the EU integration perspective. The Initiative 
is recognized as an important tool for solving regional problems in the field of 
migration and fostering the regional cooperation and partnership. The MARRI 
RC acts to support the implementation of the decisions taken by the Regional 
Forum by carrying out practical cooperation and activities.
MARRI RC acts as a strategic regional initiative for the WB and its 
objective is to perform activities in a well-coordinated manner. Therefore, MARRI 
RC has created Networks to achieve the cooperation mentioned previously.
By performing activities under the umbrella of MARRI Networks, the 
regional cooperation and information exchange mechanisms were scaled up and 
strategic comprehensive overview has been developed. Joint trainings organized 
within the MARRI area of responsibility, have assisted in capacity building and 
improvement of the security level at international airports. 
In regards to security aspects of stronger and faster integration, the 
level of developed regional cooperation represents a necessary constituent for 
accomplishment of requirements set by the EU, therefore the mission of the 
regional initiatives is to have continuous approach in enhancing the strategic and 
operational regional cooperation. The findings confirmed the significant progress 
developed with the MARRI project in the field of Airport Policing in the MARRI 
Region, but also the progress in the neighbouring countries and the benefits of 
this project to the regional and European agencies such as FRONTEX, EESO, 
etc. The MARRI project is recognized as mean to keep the network alive and 
interactive through a secure website, where the parties will communicate by 
bringing their questions (problem oriented, methodological, local/national based 
aspects), but also, as beneficiaries in using the web based communication for 
information sharing.
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 VI.  Conclusions
              The migration exodus is growing and keeping the constant number of 
5-8.000 refugees and migrants per day. Even if the cold months have arrived, 
the constant number is present. The difference is that the human beings are 
surrounded with rain, snow, ice, which jeopardize their trip.
              The countries from the Western Balkans route are more experienced, better 
organized and prepared for managing this exodus. They are managing the crises 
with their budget, which is downsizing their performances. The experiences 
when the migration flows indicate political tensions are overcome, but it doesn’t 
mean that confrontations will not be present. It is specifically possible in the 
scenario in which Germany will change its open door policy for the refugees, 
which during 2015 will be above one million. If such scenario will happen, than 
unpredicted tensions definitely will appear, with very hard consequences and the 
final situation is difficult to be predicted.
             It is encouraging that European Union is coming with more clear solutions, 
which are so far to bring the exodus in the frame of control. But, the plan from 
Brussels done on 25th of October, 2015 with 17 measures bring homogenous 
tendency between the political leaders. How this items will be implemented from 
Syria, Turkey, SEE and EU countries is too early to speak now.
               The role of the international and regional organizations is extremely 
important for better exchange of information, better synchronization of the 
coordinated measures, experience, modus operandi and taking the common 
actions. The main UN and EU organizations like UNHCR, FRONTEX, 
EASO, EUROPOL and EUROJUST are present and visible in their actions 
and significantly are helping to the affected countries. However, the regional 
organizations, specifically from the Western Balkans and SEE are quite out of 
action, rather than to be present at list with their policy, vision and reasonable 
activities.
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 Macedonia is witnessing the largest migrant crisis which is driving an 
unprecedented number of people going on life-threatening journeys to safety 
within the European Union. As a response to this crisis it seems that Macedonia 
as well as the European Union lack of solidarity and consistency to deal with this 
issue. More precisely, even though Macedonia is not a frontline country to the 
Schengen zone, still its geographical position being the crossroad on the Balkan, 
puts it in a very controversial position in this migration crisis context. Some 
of the aspects of this paper are to evaluate the key features of the Macedonian 
asylum system and their conformity with international standards and to point 
out the ongoing changes in Macedonia’s asylum policy as well as to stress the 
drawbacks of the current system. Given the fact that there are many international 
instruments that regulate asylum, the paper will make efforts to define asylum 
and its procedure according the most important instruments relevant for the EU 
1   Olga Koshevaliska is an Assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Goce Delchev University 
in Shtip and a member of the Cost project Network for experts on the legal aspects on maritime 
safety and security. 
2   Borka Tushevska Gavrilovikj is an Assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Goce Delchev 
University in Shtip and a member of the Cost project Network for experts on the legal aspects on 
maritime safety and security.
3  Ana Nikodinovska Krstevska is an Assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Goce Delchev 
University in Shtip and a member of the Cost project Network for experts on the legal aspects on 
maritime safety and security.
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Asylum policy and Macedonia’s policy. Therefore, the paper will focus on the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, EU’s Common European 
Asylum System and the Dublin system. Also it will illustrate the ongoing 
situation with asylum seekers trough numbers in order to capture a full picture 
about the current migration crises. 
I.  Introduction
The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol4 are the only global legal 
instruments explicitly covering the most important aspects of a refugee’s life. 
According to their provisions, refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same 
standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country 
and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals. The 1951 Convention also 
recognizes the importance of international solidarity and cooperation in trying to 
resolve any issues with the status and the legal position of refugees. 
The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as a person who is outside his 
or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to 
avail him—or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for 
fear of persecution.5 The difference between the refugees6 and migrants is in the 
following: the refugees are forced to flee because of a threat of persecution and 
because they lack the protection of their own country. A migrant, in comparison, 
may leave his or her country for many reasons that are not related to persecution, 
such as for the purposes of employment, family reunification or study. A migrant 
continues to enjoy the protection of his or her own government, even when abroad. 
The word “migrant” is used broadly and not always in the right manner. Hence 
in everyday use it covers people fleeing war, violence, and natural catastrophes, 
or seeking to escape poverty and it includes those who move through legal 
channels as well as those who move across borders without a visa or government 
approval (the latter is often called irregular or undocumented migration).7 Under 
4   Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Adopted on 28 July 1951 by the United Nations 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under 
General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950 Entry into force: 22 April 1954, in 
accordance with article 43;
5   Article 1, The 1951 Convention related to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, published 
by UNHCR, September 2011, p.3 available at http://www.unhcr.org/ pages/49da0e466.html 
6   Broadly, the word “refugee” describes a civilian fleeing danger, such as violence or natural 
disasters.
7   Open society Foundation, Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, https://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylum-european-
union last access on 21.09.2015;
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international law, refugees who cannot return to their home countries due to fear 
of persecution are entitled to claim protection, or asylum, in the country they 
are in. Those claiming this right—asylum seekers—are required to file a formal 
application to receive refugee status, which brings with it rights and benefits. 
This application process can be long-lasting and complicated. Not every asylum 
seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially 
an asylum seeker.
II.  The EU asylum policy
In the EU, an area of open borders and freedom of movement, countries 
share the same fundamental values and have a joint approach to guarantee high 
standards of protection for refugees. Procedures must at the same time be fair and 
effective throughout the EU and impervious to abuse. With this in mind, the EU 
States have committed to establishing a Common European Asylum System.8 
The EU’s Common European Asylum System (hereafter CEAS) is intended to 
ensure that the rights of refugees under international law are protected in its 
member states. The system sets out standards and procedures for processing and 
assessing asylum applications, and for the treatment of both asylum seekers and 
those who are granted refugee status. Also important documents regarding the EU 
asylum policy are the Dublin Convention9 and the Dublin II Regulation.10 This 
Regulation establishes the principle that only one Member State is responsible 
for examining an asylum application and that is the first EU country reached 
by the asylum seeker.11 The objective is to avoid asylum seekers from being 
sent from one country to another, and also to prevent abuse of the system by 
the submission of several applications for asylum by one person12 as well as to 
identify as quickly as possible the Member State responsible for examining an 
asylum application, and to prevent abuse of asylum procedures.13
8   See the cite on the European Commission (Migration and Home Affairs) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm last access 22.09.2015;
9  Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in 
one of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention, Official Journal C 
254 , 19/08/1997 P. 0001 – 0012;
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.
11  But Greece complained that it was blocked with applications, as so many migrants arrived in 
Greece first. Germany then suspended the Dublin rule and decided to consider asylum cases from 
the majority of Syrian applicants.
12   Commonly known as ‘asylum shopping’.
13    In order the migrants to get asylum status in the EU, they have to satisfy the authorities that they are fleeing 
persecution and would face harm or even death if sent back to their country of origin. Under EU rules, an 
asylum seeker has the right to food, first aid and shelter in a reception center. They may be granted asylum by 
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III. Is there criminal responsibility for unlawful
entry in EU country and Macedonia?
Under the Dublin Convention14 in cases when the refugees had entered 
unlawfully in the country of refuge, then the Contracting States of this Convention 
shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on 
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, under the 
condition to present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good 
cause for their illegal entry or presence. In this manner, Hungary has breached 
this article from this Convention, since it has amendment its legislative to impose 
a penalty of imprisonment up to three years, for any on the refugees that will be 
caught on the territory of Hungary. 
Also, the Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such 
refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions 
shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain 
admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees 
a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into 
another country.15 This provision was violated by every single country of this 
region that was on the path to the “good life” up north. 
Under the applicable legal framework in Macedonia, asylum-seekers 
are entitled to enjoy freedom of movement and to be protected from arbitrary 
arrest or detention.16 However the “illegal entry” into Macedonia is punishable 
by detention and expulsion from the country. An irregular migrant who is not 
identified as an asylum-seeker by the police is handed over to the High Inspector 
for Illegal Migration in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who is responsible to 
transfer the person for further processing to the closed “Reception Centre for 
Foreigners” in Gazi Baba.17 An asylum-seeker who has illegally entered or has 
the authorities at “first instance”. If unsuccessful, they can appeal against the decision in court, and may win. 
Asylum seekers are supposed to be granted the right to work within nine months of arrival. Also see Why is 
EU struggling with the migrants and asylum, available on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286 
last access 25.09.2015; 
14   Article 31 from the Convention, see footnote 6;
15   Article 31, paragraph 2 from the Dublin Convention;
16  Article 3 from the Law on Foreigners, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Macedonia No. 35 on 25 March 2006;
17  Article 153 form the Law on Foreigners, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Macedonia No. 35 on 25 March 2006. All individuals held at the Gazi Baba reception centr 
have access to information on their right to seek asylum. If an individual claims asylum while in 
detention, his/her claim should be recorded and the asylum-seeker should be transported to the 
Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers in Vizbegovo and the Section for Asylum is informed. The 
conditions in Gazi Baba have been criticized by a number of independent observers and have been 
rated as ‘’ inhuman and degrading conditions of detention’’ see OHCHR, Committee Against 
Torture, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the former Yugoslav Republic 
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been illegally staying on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, and is coming 
directly from a state where his/her life or freedom have been threatened will 
not be punished, provided that he/she immediately requests for the recognition 
of the right to asylum at the Asylum Department or reports him/herself at the 
nearest police station and explains his/her request for recognition of the right to 
asylum, as well as the justified reasons for his/her illegal entry or stay. In this 
case the police shall immediately escort the person to the Asylum Department.18 
The Law on Aliens shall not apply as of the day of submission of the request 
for recognition of the right to asylum until the day of issuing the final decision. 
The submitted request for recognition of the right to asylum shall be regarded 
as withdrawal of the request for issuance of a permit for residence to an alien, in 
terms of the provisions of the Law on Aliens.19
The Minister of Justice is responsible for the provision of free legal aid 
to those who express an intention to apply for asylum. As a result of advocacy 
efforts by UNHCR and partners, as of end June 2015 legal aid has been 
made available to those in detention who have expressed a wish to apply for 
international protection. Currently legal aid is being provided through UNHCR’s 
legal aid partner organization, the Macedonian Young Lawyer’s Association20.
IV.  Asylum through numbers
It is a fact that the vast majority of asylum applications in the EU is really 
affecting ‘only’ 5 EU Member States in 2014 and 2015, because only those 5 
Member States take in the highest numbers of refugees and face significant 
challenges in their economy. This fact has become a political block and has 
violated the ‘friendly’ relations between EU member states. In 2014, the EU 
statistics agency Eurostat Statistics,21 launched an information that 45%22 of first 
of Macedonia, May 2015; and p.9 UNHCR Observations: The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia as a Country of Asylum, UNHCR the Un Asylum Agency, August, 2015;
18   Article 17 from the LATP;
19   Article 19 of LATP;
20   Official web cite http://www.myla.org.mk/ ;
21  See the cite on Eurostat Statistic Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Asylum_statistics last access 25.09.2015;
22  According to this source in 2014 total number of 104,000 got refugee status in the EU last 
year, nearly 60,000 subsidiary protection status and just over 20,000 authorization to stay for 
humanitarian reasons. The highest number of positive asylum decisions in 2014 was in Germany 
(48,000), followed by Sweden (33,000), then France and Italy (both 21,000) and the UK (14,000). 
According to Asylum Europe the EU registered 626,710 asylum applicants in 2014, and record 
numbers during the first half of 2015 is over 300,000 asylum seekers received by four Member 
States: Germany, Hungary, France and Italy. The majority of applicants come from Syria, 
Afghanistan and Eritrea, yet their treatment varies substantially between European countries. In 
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instance asylum decisions were positive and the competent authorities granted 
refugee or subsidiary protection status, or permission to stay for humanitarian 
reasons. These data may vary depending from the source. Syrians accounted for 
the highest number of applicants in 11 of the 28 EU Member States, including 41 
thousand applicants in Germany (the highest number of applicants from a single 
country to one of the EU Member States in 2014) and 31 thousand applicants in 
Sweden. Some 27 thousand Serbians and 13 thousand Eritreans also applied for 
asylum in Germany and 12 thousand Eritreans in Sweden. The only other EU 
Member States to receive in excess of 10 thousand asylum applicants in 2014 
from a single group of citizens were Hungary (21 thousand Kosovans) and Italy 
(10 thousand Nigerians).23
V.  Macedonia on the crossroad 
Macedonia is witnessing the largest migrant crisis which is driving an 
unprecedented number of people going on life-threatening journeys to safety. At 
his point we can say that Macedonian as well as the European Union’s common 
policy on asylum lacks solidarity and consistency (according to the AIDA Annual 
Report 2014/2015 – Common asylum system at a turning point: Refugees caught 
in Europe’s solidarity crisis).24 
Some 3,000 people are expected to cross into Macedonia each day in the 
coming months, according to the UN. In 2011, Macedonia received 744 asylum 
applications from individuals from outside the region, four times more than in 
2010. In 2012, 638 applications were received and in 2013 a total of 1,353 new 
asylum applications were submitted. In 2014, some 1,289 new asylum-seekers 
from 19 different countries were registered in the country and as of end June 2015, 
1,446 persons had applied for asylum, out of whom over 50 per cent were Syrian 
nationals. Currently about 80 per cent of those who apply for asylum are single 
men (18-35 years of age), but there is an increasing trend of unaccompanied 
2014, positive decision rates for Eritrean nationals varied from 26% in France to 100% in Sweden, 
while rates for Iraqi nationals ranged from 14% in Greece to 94% in France. See http://www.
asylumineurope.org/news/10-09-2015/aida-annual-report-20142015-launched-today last visited 
11.09.2015;
23 Data from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics last 
access 25.09.2015;
24   Annual AIDA Report 2014/2015: Common asylum system at a turning point: Refugees caught in 
Europe’s solidarity crisis. The report covers research for 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Germany, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Turkey - See more at: http://www.asylumineurope.
org/annual-report-20142015#sthash.ejTDhelJ.dpuf last access 11.09.2015;
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and separated children arriving.25 In 2015, despite the high number of asylum 
applications, so far only one person has been recognized as a refugee. But from 
these applications, more that 90 % of those who apply for asylum in Macedonia 
leave the country on their way to EU Member States, before interviews are held 
and the first instance decision is taken.26 Since many asylum-seekers leave, the 
majority of cases in 2013, 2014 and 2015 were dismissed due to ‘withdrawal’ of 
asylum requests, although some cases were also pending decision to be taken by 
the Section for Asylum. Meanwhile, in the period between the adoption of the 
amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection on 18 June 2015 
and the end July 2015, the authorities have registered 18,750 persons expressing 
an intention to seek asylum in the country, with trend of some 1,000 new arrivals 
every day.
 Picture 1: Asylum seekers in Macedonia by country of origin.
 Source: UNHCR Observations: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
as a Country of Asylum, UNHCR the UN Asylum Agency, August, 2015;
25   See p.6 of UNHCR Observations: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a Country 
of Asylum, UNHCR the Un Asylum Agency, August, 2015;
26  For example, out of the 1,353 asylum applications lodged in 2013, only one interview was 
held and had a decision taken, which was the granting of subsidiary protection. In 2014, out of 
1,289 applications lodged, only 16 decisions on asylum claims were made, with 12 asylum-seekers 
from Syria being recognized as refugees, while one person was granted subsidiary protection. This 
information has also been confirmed by the Section for Asylum, Ministry of Interior. See more 
about these data on p.5 of  UNHCR Observations: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as 
a Country of Asylum, UNHCR the Un Asylum Agency, August, 2015;
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Even though Macedonia is not a frontline country to the Schengen zone, 
still its geographical position (being the crossroad on the Balkan) puts the country 
in a very controversial position in this migration crisis context. 
VI.  Macedonian asylum policy and its shortcomings 
Macedonia has a national asylum law, the Law on Asylum and Temporary 
Protection (hereafter LATP).27  LATP28 was substantially amended several 
times,29 and the last amendment was in response to urgent need to resolve the 
crisis with the influx of migrants. The amendment changed the previously 
restrictive regulations for applying for asylum, which exposed asylum-seekers to 
a risk of arbitrary detention and return at the border. The new amendments, which 
were adopted on 18 June 2015 and entered into force the same day, introduce a 
procedure for registration of the intention to submit an asylum application at 
the border, protect asylum-seekers from the risk of refoulement30 and allow 
them to enter and be in the country legally for a short timeframe of 72 hours, 
before formally registering their asylum application. In 2015 the government 
of Macedonia initiated the drafting of a new asylum law, that is supposed to be 
in line with the EU asylum instruments and it is planned to be adopted in 2016.
27   Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, published in the Official Gazette No. 54 on 15 April 
2013, http://www.slvesnik.com.mk/Issues /3dff1ee8f23e4547 ad198661 fe 7941 49.pdf last access 
25.09.2015;
28 According to UNHCR the law currently incorporates many key provisions of the 1951 
Convention. Furthermore, the provisions on subsidiary protection in the law are in conformity 
with relevant EU standards.
29   Amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, published in the Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Macedonia No. 49/03, 66/07, 142/08, 146/09, 166/12 and 101/15.
30  This principle is explained in article 7 of the Law on Asylum and Temporary. According to the 
principle of non – refoulement: The asylum seeker, recognized refugee or person under subsidiary 
protection cannot be expelled, or in any manner whatsoever be forced to return to the frontiers 
of the state:  in which his/her life or freedom would be threatened due to his/her race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; or where he/she would be 
subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. (2) The prohibition referred 
to in paragraph 1 line 1 of this Article shall not apply to an alien who is considered a danger to 
the safety of the Republic of Macedonia, or who, after having been convicted by a legally valid 
decision of a crime or especially of a serious crime, is considered a danger for the citizens of the 
Republic of Macedonia. The alien referred to paragraph 1 line 2 of this Article, who for the reasons 
referred to in Article 6 of this Law cannot enjoy the right to asylum in the Republic of Macedonia, 
shall be allowed to remain within the territory of the Republic of Macedonia as long as in the state 
of his/her nationality or, if he/she has no nationality, in the state of his/her habitual residence, 
he/she would be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The alien 
referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, during his/her stay in the Republic of Macedonia, shall 
have the same rights and duties as the persons under temporary protection in the Republic of 
Macedonia.
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There are positive developments in terms of amending the asylum 
legislation31 but still Macedonia is not considered as a safe third country. 
In accordance with the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection32, 
asylum-seekers can now register an intention to apply for asylum at the border 
entry points, in which case the asylum-seeker is provided with a travel permit 
valid for 72 hours, for the purpose of travelling to a police station to formally 
register the asylum claim. If already inside the country, the asylum-seeker must 
register his or her asylum application at the nearest police station. After the 
initial registration, the police are responsible for referring the asylum-seeker to 
the Section for Asylum within the Ministry of Interior, which is the primary 
governmental body responsible for implementation of the reception and asylum 
procedure, including escorting the asylum-seeker(s) to the country’s only 
reception center for asylum-seekers.
Under the new Criminal Procedure Code,33 migrants and asylum-seekers 
arrested together with their smugglers were considered to be witnesses in the 
criminal cases subsequently pursued against the latter. As a consequence, asylum-
seekers were detained in Gazi Baba for the purposes of ‘securing evidence’, 
which resulted in their deprivation of liberty for the entire criminal process (which 
could last three months and sometimes even longer), despite the prohibition 
31   Despite significant progress made to align the national legislative framework with international 
standards on asylum, UNHCR concludes that substantial shortcomings still persist when it comes 
to implementation. According to this observation the government currently lacks capacity to 
ensure protection to the increasing number of asylum-seekers. There are concerns about access to 
the territory and the asylum procedure. The lack of timely issuance of adequate identification (ID) 
documents and concerns regarding the processing of claims exposes asylum-seekers to the risk of 
not being able to obtain international protection, or to exercise rights associated with international 
protection. The quality of decision-making of asylum claims remains inadequate, as decisions often 
do not contain clear reasoning, and reference to national security concerns is used excessively as 
a ground for rejection of applications for international protection. There is also a lack of access to 
effective legal remedies, as cases are not considered on their merits in the judicial review phase. 
Other basic procedural safeguards such as access to information and interpretation are not always 
ensured. Moreover, refugees and subsidiary protection holders have limited integration prospects. 
UNHCR concludes that the country does not as yet meet international standards for the protection 
of refugees, and does not qualify as a safe third country. Accordingly, UNHCR advises that 
other states should refrain from returning or sending asylum seekers to Macedonia, until further 
improvements to address these gaps have been made, in accordance with international standards. 
See p.3 from UNHCR Observations: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a Country of 
Asylum, UNHCR the Un Asylum Agency, August, 2015;
32  Article 16 from the  Amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, published 
in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 101/15;J
33  Criminal Procedure Code, published in the Official gazette No. 150 on 18 November 2010, 
entered into force on 01.12.2013;
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under Macedonian law of detaining asylum-seekers.34 However, as a result of 
the previously mentioned amendments of the Law on Asylum and Temporary 
Protection, allowing asylum-seekers to register their asylum application at the 
border, there has been a reduction in asylum-seekers being arrested on charges 
of irregular entry or stay. 
Since the end of June 2015 the Ministry of interior and the Public 
Prosecution Office have also speeded their processing of asylum-seekers held 
in detention in order to serve as witnesses in criminal cases, as a result of which 
almost all asylum-seekers held in detention (some 350 individuals as of June 
2015) have been referred to the open Vizbegovo RC.35 
The Ministry of Interior, through its organizational unit in charge of 
asylum (Asylum Department), is responsible for conducting the first instance 
procedure for recognition of the right to asylum and shall make a decision. This 
department is obliged to co-operate with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees in all phases of the procedure for recognition of the right to asylum.36 
The asylum seekers have the right to legal assistance and explanation 
regarding the conditions and the procedure for recognition of the right to asylum, 
as well as the right to free legal aid in all phases of the procedure, in accordance 
with the regulations on free legal aid. The asylum seekers in all phases of the 
procedure may communicate with persons who provide legal assistance, with 
the representatives of the High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as with 
non-governmental humanitarian organizations. The representatives of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees have the right to access to, and communicate with, 
the asylum seekers, in all phases of the procedure, wherever they are staying.37
The asylum procedure is carried out in accordance with the Law on General 
Administrative Procedure.38 The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection 
34  The long detention period was mainly due to the lack of interpreters in relevant languages for 
criminal court cases. According to the law, the police cannot detain a person without a court order, 
which needs to be produced within 24 hours. However, in practice those detained in order to serve 
as witnesses were not considered to be formally detained. Since the detention was not formalized 
with a court order, it was also impossible to appeal against the decision to detain the person. 
Upon release from detention, the persons concerned often left the the Repubic of Macedonia 
immediately. In the absence of witness statements, the smugglers were released, as the police was 
often unable to gather enough evidence to charge the smugglers. UNHCR has been working with 
the authorities to accelerate the court procedure in order to reduce the period in detention, as well 
as to advocate for alternatives to detention.
35   See p.11 of UNHCR Observations: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a Country 
of Asylum, UNHCR the Un Asylum Agency, August, 2015. UNHCR continues to advocate with 
the authorities for the Criminal Code to be amended in order to ensure that asylum-seekers are not 
detained if summoned to act as witnesses in court cases;
36   Article 12  and 13 of the Law for Asylum and Temporary protection;
37   Article 14, Ibid;
38  Article 15 of LATP and Law on the General Administrative Procedure (“Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Macedonia” no. 38/2005, 110/2008 and 51/2011). Decision of the Constitutional 
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allows for a speeded or a regular procedure, where a speeded procedure is 
initiated for those claims that are considered to be manifestly unfounded.39 The 
Asylum Department decides whether a case should be processed in the regular 
or speeded procedure based on information obtained during registration and 
based on provisions in the law. The majority of cases are referred for regular 
processing.
VII.  Intention to submit a request for recognition of the right
to asylum and request for recognition of the right to asylum
A foreigner at the border crossing point or in the inland of the Republic 
of Macedonia may orally or in a written form state his/her intention to submit a 
request for recognition of the right to asylum to a police officer of the Ministry 
of Interior. The police officer will write down the personal data of the foreigner 
who has stated his/her intention, and shall issue a copy of the certificate for the 
stated intention, and shall instruct him/her, within a period of 72 hours, to submit 
a request for recognition of the right to asylum with an authorized official in 
the premises of the Asylum Department situated in the Reception Center for 
Asylum Seekers. If the foreigner does not act in accordance with this, it shall 
be acted in accordance with the regulations on foreigners. An asylum seeker 
may submit a request for recognition of the right to asylum to the police at the 
border crossing point, in the nearest police station, or in the premises of the 
Asylum Department situated in the Reception Center for Asylum Seekers. If the 
request is submitted to the police at the border crossing point or in the nearest 
police station, the police officer shall escort the asylum seeker to the Reception 
Center for Asylum Seekers.40 Upon submission of the request for recognition of 
the right to asylum, the Asylum Department shall, within a period of three days, 
issue to the asylum seeker a sealed certificate, containing the number and date 
of submission, confirming the status of an asylum seeker and proving that the 
asylum seeker is allowed to stay on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia 
for the duration of the procedure upon his/her request for recognition of the right 
to asylum. 
Court of the Republic of Macedonia, U.no. 102/2008 dated 10.09.2008, published in the “Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia” no. 118/2008;
39   Article 34 from the LATP: The urgent procedure shall be conducted if the request for recognition 
of the right to asylum is obviously unfounded, unless an unaccompanied minor or a mentally 
disabled person has submitted the request. In this paper well only refer to the regular procedure.
40  Article 16 -1 from the LATP. An asylum seeker, who resides on the territory of the Republic of 
Macedonia, shall submit a request for recognition of the right to asylum to the Asylum Department. 
In cases of family reunification, the request may be submitted to the diplomatic-consular mission 
of the Republic of Macedonia abroad.
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The Asylum Department in the Ministry of Interiors shall notify the asylum 
seekers, in writing and orally, in a language that can be reasonably presumed that 
they understand, and within a time period not exceeding 15 days as of the day of 
submission of the request for recognition of the right to asylum, about the manner 
of conducting the procedure for recognition of the right to asylum, about the 
rights and obligations of the asylum seeker in that procedure, about the possible 
consequences if they do not comply with their obligations and do not cooperate 
with the competent bodies, as well as about the conditions for accepting the 
right to legal assistance, as well as the right to contact persons providing legal 
assistance, representatives of the High Commissioner for Refugees and non-
governmental humanitarian organizations, during all the phases of the procedure 
no matter where the asylum seekers are.41 During this procedure the rights to 
interpreter and the right to secrecy are recognized.42 
But is a fact that up to 90 per cent of asylum-seekers leave the country 
before the asylum procedure is completed that means that Macedonia is used 
as transit stage on the way to Western Europe. The authorities close the case 
files of asylum-seekers who have left the country as “unfounded” on procedural 
grounds.43
The asylum seekers can withdrawal the request for recognition of the right 
to asylum. The request for recognition of the right to asylum shall be considered 
withdrawn and the procedure shall be discontinued by a conclusion if it is 
determined that the asylum seeker has withdrawn the request for recognition 
of the right to asylum, has not responded to the call for hearing in the Asylum 
Department, and he/she has not justified the absence within a period of 48 hours 
as of the day the hearing has been scheduled, has left the place determined for his/
her accommodation without an approval in the course of the procedure, longer 
than three days without informing the competent body or without obtaining 
consent from the competent body for leaving the place determined for his/her 
accommodation.44  
VIII.  Regular procedure for recognition of the right to asylum
The Asylum Department is the body responsible for the implementation 
of a regular procedure for recognition of the right to asylum in the first instance. 
This Department is obliged to adopt the decision within six months as of the 
day of submission of the request. Firstly, before reaching any decision there has 
to be a hearing of the asylum seeker. The asylum seeker has the possibility to 
41   Article 17 from the LATP;
42   Article 21 and 22 from the LATP respectively; 
43  Information obtained by UNHCR through discussions with the Section for Asylum. See UNHCR 
Observations;
44  Article 24 from the LATP;
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be personally heard, and the hearing may be recorded as a sound for which the 
asylum seeker will be previously informed. The hearing is confidential and is 
gender sensitive.45 The authorized official who conducts the hearing will take into 
consideration the personal or general circumstances of the asylum seeker which 
refer to the request for recognition of the right to asylum, including the cultural 
origin or the vulnerability of the asylum seeker, in the manner and in the volume 
possible to do that. An interpreter can be provided. The communication shall not 
be necessary to be led in a language required by the asylum seeker, in the case 
where the asylum seeker may communicate in another language for which it may 
be reasonably presumed that he/she understands. During the hearing, the asylum 
seeker shall present all the facts and evidence of relevance for establishing the 
existence of a well-founded fear of persecution. During the hearing, minutes 
shall be kept and the participants of the hearing shall sign the minutes.46 
The request for recognition of the right to asylum shall be rejected in the 
course of a regular procedure in case it is established that: 
i.  there is no well-founded fear of persecution in terms of Article 4 of the LATP;
ii. there are reasons for expulsion referred to in Article 6 of the LATP; and
iii. the persecution for the reasons referred to in Article 4 of the LATP is limited 
only to a particular geographic area of the state of his/her nationality or, if he/
she has no nationality, in the state of his/her habitual residence, and that there is 
a possibility for effective protection in another part of the state, unless in light 
of all circumstances it cannot be expected that the person shall seek protection 
there.47 
The Asylum Department can adopt the following decisions: decision to 
recognize the status of a recognized refugee, a decision to recognize the status 
of a person under subsidiary protection,48 or a decision to reject the request for 
recognition of the right to asylum.49
45  The asylum seekers, upon their request, shall have the right to be heard by an authorized same 
sex official of the Asylum Department.
46  Article 28 of the LATP;
47   Article 29 of the LATP. In cases where it is established that the asylum seeker does not meet the 
conditions for recognition of the right to asylum in accordance, the Asylum Department shall, ex 
officio , investigate the existence of reasons and conditions for recognition of the right to asylum 
due to subsidiary protection in accordance with Article 2 line 2 of this Law;
48   If both parents have acquired the status of a recognized refugee or of a person under subsidiary 
protection, the Asylum Department may adopt a decision to recognize the same status to their 
minor child born and living on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Where one of the 
parents has acquired the status, the Asylum Department may adopt a decision the minor child 
born and living on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia to recognize the right to asylum, a 
recognized refugee or subsidiary protection.
49  The decision to reject the request for recognition of the right to asylum shall state the reasons, 
due to which the request has not been accepted, the advice on legal remedy and the time frame 
within which the person is obliged to leave the territory of Republic of Macedonia, which cannot 
be less than 15 days from the day on which the decision becomes effective.
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The asylum seeker may initiate an administrative dispute with the 
competent court against the decision of the Asylum Department within 30 
days as of the day of delivery of the decision. The lawsuit shall postpone the 
enforcement of the decision.
If the asylum seeker submits a new request for recognition of the right 
to asylum, he/she must provide evidence that his/her circumstances have 
significantly altered since the moment of adoption of the former decision to 
reject his/her request for recognition of the right to asylum. If he/she fails to do 
so, the Asylum Department shall reject the request.50
The termination of the right to asylum recognized in the Republic of 
Macedonia shall apply for a person who has voluntarily re-availed him/herself 
under protection of the country of his/her nationality; who has, after losing the 
nationality of that country, voluntarily re-acquired it; who has acquired a new 
nationality and enjoys the protection of the state of his/her new nationality; who 
has voluntarily re-established him/herself in the country which he/she left or 
outside which he/she remained owing to fear of persecution; who can no longer 
continue to refuse to avail him/herself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality, because the circumstances in connection with which he/she has been 
granted asylum have ceased to exist,; and who has no nationality, and is able to 
return to the state of his/her former habitual residence, because the circumstances 
in connection with which he/she has been granted asylum have ceased to exist. 
Regarding the termination of the right to asylum for the reasons referred above, 
a procedure shall be conducted, as well as for recognition of the right to asylum.
IX.  Conclusions
Under international law, refugees who cannot return to their home 
countries due to fear of persecution are entitled to claim protection, or asylum, 
in the country they are in. Also, refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same 
standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country 
and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals. Not every asylum seeker 
will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an 
asylum seeker. Those claiming this right—asylum seekers—are required to file 
a formal application to receive refugee status, which brings with it rights and 
benefits. This application process can be long-lasting and complicated. At this 
point we can say that Macedonian as well as the European Union’s common 
policy on asylum lacks solidarity and consistency to deal with this problem. 
The EU’s Common European Asylum System is intended to ensure that the 
rights of refugees under international law are protected in its member states. The 
50   Article 33 of the LATP;
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system sets out standards and procedures for processing and assessing asylum 
applications, and for the treatment of both asylum seekers and those who are 
granted refugee status. It is a fact that the vast majority of asylum applications in 
the EU is really affecting ‘only’ 5 EU Member States in 2014 and 2015, because 
only those 5 Member States take in the highest numbers of refugees and face 
significant challenges in their economy. This fact has become a political block 
and has violated the ‘friendly’ relations between EU member states. Under the 
applicable legal framework in Macedonia, asylum-seekers are entitled to enjoy 
freedom of movement and to be protected from arbitrary arrest or detention. 
Even though we are not a frontline country to the Schengen zone, still the 
geographical position of Macedonia (being the crossroad on the Balkan) puts us 
in a very controversial position in this migration crisis context. Macedonia has a 
national asylum law, the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection which was 
substantially amended several times, and the last amendment was in response 
to urgent need to resolve the crisis with the influx of migrants. The amendment 
changed the previously restrictive regulations for applying for asylum, which 
exposed asylum-seekers to a risk of arbitrary detention and return at the border. 
The new amendments, which were adopted on 18 June 2015 and entered into 
force the same day, introduce a procedure for registration of the intention to 
submit an asylum application at the border, protect asylum-seekers from the risk 
of refoulement and allow them to enter and be in the country legally for a short 
timeframe of 72 hours, before formally registering their asylum application. In 
2015 the government of Macedonia initiated the drafting of a new asylum law, 
that is supposed to be in line with the EU asylum instruments and it is planned 
to be adopted in 2016. Under the new Criminal Procedure Code, migrants and 
asylum-seekers arrested together with their smugglers were considered to be 
witnesses in the criminal cases subsequently pursued against the latter. As a 
consequence, asylum-seekers were detained in Gazi Baba for the purposes of 
‘securing evidence’, which resulted in their deprivation of liberty for the entire 
criminal process (which could last three months and sometimes even longer), 
despite the prohibition under Macedonian law of detaining asylum-seekers. 
However, as a result of the previously mentioned amendments of the Law on 
Asylum and Temporary Protection, allowing asylum-seekers to register their 
asylum application at the border, there has been a reduction in asylum-seekers 
being arrested on charges of irregular entry or stay. 
Macedonia has steadily strengthened its asylum system over the years. 
The legislative framework has been improvement and is today largely in line 
with international standards. But significant weaknesses persist in the asylum 
system in practice. Macedonia has not been able to ensure that asylum-seekers 
have access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure. This is reflected, amongst 
others, by the fact that the Macedonia has not yet put in place protection sensitive 
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screening mechanisms at the border to identify those who may be in need of 
protection and to refer the individuals concerned to appropriate procedures. 
Considering the outstanding gaps in the asylum system in Macedonia and 
taking into account the sharp increase in the number of new arrivals in the country 
more recently which presents major challenges to the asylum environment, 
UNHCR considers that the country does not as yet meet international standards 
for the protection of refugees, and does not qualify as a safe third country. 
Accordingly, UNHCR advises that other states should refrain from returning or 
sending asylum-seekers to the country, until further improvements to address 
these gaps have been made by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.
THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS
OF THE REFUGEE CRISIS
Mersiha Smailovikj1
A Testimonial from a Humanitarian NGO activist regarding the refugee crisis 
in Macedonia, presented at the International Conference Migration at sea: 
International Law Perspectives and Legal Approaches (06 Oct 2015, Ohrid) 
reproduced in written form 
Respected colleagues, Professors, activists….
Thank you for your invitation to be part of this international conference.
Even if the focus of this conference is “Migration in the Mediterranean”, 
still, myself as an activist from Macedonia, I will speak about the refugee crisis 
in Macedonia, as witnessed from the ground route. 
For the first time in modern history, the country became part of important 
global happenings and movements that affect not only the Balkans and the 
European Union, but the entire world community. Unexpectedly, Macedonia 
became a key component of the so-called “Balkan route”, the route that migrants 
take in order to reach EU states like Austria or Germany in order to seek asylum. 
This specific geopolitical position, imposed the country with an important or 
better to say a crucial role in the migration phenomenon, which as awkward as it 
seems implies “defending” national borders from illegal crossings from Greece, 
an EU-country and a member of the Schengen zone.
This migration phenomenon became known to the Macedonian public 
for the first time in November 2014, when a “migrant was run over by a train 
on the railway from Veles to Skopje”.2 This shocking news that reached to every 
person, raised many questions and pored many doubts. In fact, myself and my 
colleagues from the NGO “LEGIS” - a humanitarian organization that participated 
in several big humanitarian actions in Syria, we posed some important questions 
1  Mersiha Smailovijk has a degree in Law and is the Vice President of the NGO “Legis” in 
Republic of Macedonia
2   http://mrt.com.mk/node/16671 
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about what was happening in Macedonia… How come all of a sudden there are 
so many migrants that cross the country? Where do they come from? Where are 
they headed to? What is their route? Why do they cross Macedonia and why do 
they take the railway instead of seeking other passages?
Of course, our questions and demands brought us to discover the 
unfortunate migrants’ road through Macedonia, to interrogate Macedonia’s laws 
and legislation, and to actively help refugees and also being involved in the 
ongoing crisis. 
Let me begin from the very origin of migration flow which took the route 
through Macedonia. Namely, most of the migrants or better to say refugees, are 
coming from war zones in the Middle East and other countries. After taking a 
dangerous boat trip from Turkey to Greece, they disembark on Greek soil where 
usually refugees obtain registration documents that allow them to travel through 
Greece. Afterwards, they take public transport to Thessaloniki (in northern 
Greece), and from there refugees walk by foot for approximately 30 km to the 
village of Idomeni, that is  the nearest village to Macedonia’s boarder. From here, 
in order to avoid border police and vehicle patrol, they pass through natural non-
marked and unsafe land in order to reach Macedonia’s boarders. 
After the point of reaching and entering Macedonia, here is where our 
first contact with the refugees started, and most probably the only contact, since 
during the first half of 2015 we were the only organization to assist and to help 
the refugees. Apart from us, there was also a 48 year old woman from the city 
of Veles (a town near the capital), Lence Zdravkin3 is her name, who had her 
household right in front of the train rail where the refugees were passing. Lence 
was constantly assisting and helping the refugees all day and all night long, 
giving them food, refreshments, clothing, first necessities etc. In fact, most of 
the refugees called her the “Mother of the refugees”. 
This situation started changing and the public opinion became aware 
of the refugees flow, when on the 24th of April it went on the breaking news the 
information that 14 migrants died on the train tracks in Veles.4 The majority of 
migrants were teenagers from Afghanistan and one of them was from Somalia. 
It was then when the Macedonian public for the first time, started talking with 
compassion and solidarity for these innocent souls, whose “only sin” was, wrong 
nationality!
After this tragedy, LEGIS started investigating these events and of 
course we started interrogating many aspects of what was to be the following 
refugee crisis. In fact, here is where things started to become really intriguing and 
interesting. The first thing that came out from our conversations and interviews 
3    http://www.independent.mk/articles/20441/Exemplary+Humanitarian+Lence+Zdravkin+Help
s+Immigrants+Daily 
4  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/several-migrants-hit-by-train-killed-central-
macedonia 
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with the refugees, was Macedonia’s Law on Foreigners and the treatment of 
refugees/migrants. 
Namely, according to the Law on Foreigners5, anyone that illegally 
crosses into Macedonia (presumably that they are smuggled by smugglers), 
will be deported to the country of first entry; and while awaiting the process 
of interrogation and investigation, those foreigners will be accommodated in a 
Reception Center “Gazi Baba” in Skopje, better known as a detention facility. 
Having said that, most often happens that refugees, unfamiliar with the territory 
of the Republic of Macedonia, they turn to smugglers. The smugglers on the other 
hand, have already well established network, which is among the best developed 
businesses on the black market in Macedonia, and of course smuggling had 
become the most frequent criminal offence prosecuted either. In fact, as of 31st of 
May 2015 the Public Prosecution stated6 that 160 criminal proceedings, which 
amongst other were initiated by the inquiries of LEGIS,  were undertaken against 
nationals and foreigners under a founded suspicion that they were smuggling 
illegal migrants.
The most interesting and intriguing part is yet to come. Namely, the 
amendments to the Criminal Law according to which the witness must testify 
against the perpetrator of the criminal offence, implied that in every police 
action where smugglers were arrested, refugees were also arrested and taken 
to the transit Centre of “Gazi Baba”, in order to wait for trial (of the smuggler), 
so they could testify about the identification of the perpetrator of the criminal 
offence, i.e. ”human trafficking”. Furthermore, the amendments of the Criminal 
Code7 that refer to Public Prosecutor as in charge of the investigation measures, 
greatly slowed down the work of the prosecution, which as a result prolonged 
the stay of the arrested refugees in the Centre of “Gazi Baba” even for months. 
The procedure continues in a way that after their testimony, refugees are allowed 
to seek asylum or otherwise if they do not seek, they will be deported back to 
Greece or Bulgaria or the country of entry. In fact, in base of the inquiries that 
LEGIS has conducted on field, we found out that refugees were detained in this 
Reception centre without actually being charged or without even being put on 
testimony. Sadly to know, this detention sometimes lasted up to 8 months in 
environments that did not fulfil the minimum living standards, where regrettably 
refugees had to stay in inhumane conditions. 
Having the thought that the migrants were refugees, running away from 
war, torture… everything that it is written in the International Convention for 
refugees8 for what you could hear in their life stories, pushed us to investigate 
even more thoroughly the whole situation. Unfortunately, even if Macedonia 
5   http://62.162.77.57/Uploads/Precisten%20zakon%20za%20strancite%2025.-01.13.pdf 
6   http://jorm.gov.mk/ 
7    http://finpol.gov.mk/Files/Zakon/4.pdf
8   http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html  
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has accessed and is a part of all Geneva Conventions and other UN international 
documents, and even though the country developed in 2008 a long term strategy 
for refugees and foreigners9, still the we were witnessing refugees that walked 
for 8 days by foot, that we hungry, were unprotected and beaten by criminal 
gangs10, and were forced to use smugglers. At the end of the day, they were just 
‘illegal immigrants’ with no rights. The most disappointing things was that we 
couldn’t secure them with basic human rights like the RIGHT TO LIFE. 
Willing to oppose and fight the impotence towards these breaches 
of human rights we turned to UNHCR office in Macedonia, in order to seek 
clarification and answers. However, after various attempts to gain some kind of 
information unfortunately we didn’t receive any feedback.
Instead, we found an open door with Human Rights Watch, who were 
willing to work with us and together we continued investigating the status of 
refugees and migrants in Macedonia. The field investigation started in January, 
and ended in September 2015, and the final outcome of it was summarized in a 59 
pages report11 which was drafted upon more than 64 testimonies of refugees, that 
testified about their trip through Macedonia and especially about the terrifying 
conditions in the Reception centre in “Gazi Baba”. Our report got high feedback 
from the public opinion, and soon after as a result the Reception centre was 
closed, and the remaining migrants were transferred to a new facility.
In parallel, we also started making pressure on the local political elite 
with the purpose of changing the Law for Asylum in Macedonia, as well as we 
had also numerous meetings and interviews with Members of the Parliament, 
who we pressurized in order to make the presence of the refugees in Macedonia 
to be legal. Combining these actions together with the harsh public opinion 
that couldn’t stand watching refugees walking on foot or driving bicycle along 
dangerous roads, the Parliament drafted a new article in the Law of Asylum, 
adding the term: expressed intention for applying request to seek asylum. 12 This 
meant that refugees who will express their intention in a police station, they 
will get a document issued by the Police with which they could legally travel 
through Macedonia by registered means of transportation (for example train, bus 
or licenced taxi), and within 72 hours from their first entry they have to leave the 
country. After the expiration of this timeframe, refugees that are still found on 
the territory of the country, are allowed either to ask for Asylum or otherwise be 
deported back to the country of their entry.
Taking stand of the reviewed legislation, a new wave of refugees 
knocked on Macedonia’s doors, walking by foot and up-taking dangerous 
9    http://mtsp.gov.mk/WBStorage/Files/strategija_begalci.pdf 
10   http://daily.mk/makedonija/pretepan-ograben-migrant-sirija-1 
11 https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/21/though-we-are-not-human-beings/police-brutality-aga-
inst-migrants-and-asylum 
12   http://www.voanews.com/content/macedonia-migrants-asylum-law/2828577.html 
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journeys through the rail tracks, along with many small children and babies with 
them. The lack of a proper response from the institutions and the state, generated 
a humanitarian wave of self-organised citizen initiatives, where LEGIS was the 
most active organization with the role of an all-unifying, inspirational agent 
in the country – it did not matter which religion, ethnicity or nationality you 
were, in front of that we were all united for a common goal – help the ones 
that are helpless. Except for LEGIS and the NGO NUN, with whom we were 
working in a stationary near the train station, providing for food and clothing, 
the UNHCR and the Red Cross were also present in the vicinity, providing for 
medical assistance on the road. As Aleksandra Davidovska, an activist of LEGIS 
from Kumanovo, concerning the mosque of Kumanovo where refugees were 
being accommodated, justifiably observed:
“As an atheist, never in my life did I think that I would spend that much 
time in the house of God. Of any God. But what this house represents 
in times of incessant suffering and deep pain of thousands of people – 
when the institutions that have the authority to help, decide to resort 
to bureaucratic excuses and remain blind – what this house represents, 
restores my faith. Not in God, but in humanity. In doing good. Regardless 
of nationality or religion.”
Portrayed in numbers, this massive influx counted more than 1000 
refugees registered per day, but however, the number of the refugees that could 
travel through Macedonia to Serbia’s border, was not more than 500 refugees, 
since there was only one train in circulation. This once again showed a shameful 
picture of especially of Macedonia’s institutions.13
The road that the refugees took once they entered Macedonia was long. 
Firstly, refugees entered the country from Idomeni to Gevgelija (the nearest town 
on the Macedonian side), in only one border crossing - stone 59. While entering 
Macedonia, each refugee had to possess Greek registration documents or any 
other document that would confirm their nationality. Going further on, from the 
border crossing to the camp there are about 600 meters, and here refugees gathered 
and waited in groups to enter the camp. The waiting time was from 1 until 3 
hours. After they’ve entered, refugees waited for registration in Macedonia that 
lasted maximum one hour. During their stay in the camp, refugees were being 
provided with complete aid that was offered from the organizations in the camp. 
The aid comprised food for each refugee, free medical aid, tents for mothers and 
children with heating and educational materials, winter clothes and shoes, and all 
13   http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3165752/Hundreds-migrants-clamber-board-packed-
trains-Macedonia-desperate-attempt-seek-new-life-Europe-Hungary-build-175km-fence-stop-
crossing-country.html 
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was free of charge. Continuing the journey, refugees needed 3 or 4 hours to reach 
the Serbian border. There was another camp in a place called Tabanovce on the 
border with Serbia, about 5,5 km from the first village Miratovac, from where 
refugees usually walked by foot, on plus temperatures or in dark night, because 
state authorities didn’t organize any transport. In this camp as well the one in 
Gevgelija, thankful to NGO Legis, Vlaznia and Merhamet, refugees received aid 
that was free of charge. 
However, regardless of Aleksandra’s precious words we witnessed for 
the umpteenth time a state restriction to the humanitarian wave. All of a sudden 
it became “illegal” to give water to a person that is thirsty or to give shoes to a 
kid that is barefoot. In fact, an arbitrary rule was introduced which prescribed 
that anyone that wants to give water to another human being (refugee) and help 
refugees in general, should be registered to an organization! And this was said to 
be “according to the law”, even though no such law was to be found anywhere. 
Once again, NGO LEGIS played the leading unifying role here as well. In spite 
of all restrictions, LEGIS opened the door for every citizen who wanted to get 
involved in humanitarian actions, so that he or she could help refugees. 
Furthermore, as the number of refugee’s increased, the State xenophobia 
also climbed to an alarming level in Gevgelija.  In fact, we witnessed the closure 
of the state border for 3 days and the proclamation of a state of emergency. 14 
Soon after, the State established a new camp, right outside of the city Gevgelija, 
in an empty desert, which did not have any water nor electricity, nor did it have 
any track of civilization. Luckily, the daily work of LEGIS together with other 
organizations, including the UNHCR who rapidly provided the main facilities, 
we managed to put in place a camp that provided refugees with the basic needs. 
And sadly to say, but the situation in Tabanovce was some kind similar.
Summa summarum, around a million refugees entered Macedonia and at 
the same time left the country. Until now, no request for asylum was prosecuted 
and neither was it granted. My message to the Government and to the EU is 
that we should not leave refugees helpless. They are people like all of us. The 
only difference is that they are escaping from war, terror and indecency, without 
wanting that, and we, we are closing doors like they are aliens from another 
world. Furthermore, the EU should not forget that Macedonia is also a poor 
country and it cannot struggle alone with the influx of refugees. However, at 
the end of the day, we, LEGIS are happy to have the chance to tell all of them: 
Refugees, welcome in Macedonia! 
14   http://vlada.mk/node/10918 
CONCLUSIONS
Giuseppe Cataldi1
The papers presented in this volume examine questions of dramatic and 
immediate relevance. They also deal with themes of immigration by sea from a 
special, and decidedly interesting, perspective – the perspective of the Balkan 
region. 
Because of the widespread economic crisis and political instability 
existing throughout the African continent and the Middle East, exacerbated by 
the “Arab Springs”, the phenomenon of immigrants seeking a better life has 
become a mass exodus in the past few years. As we all know, the right of human 
beings to emigrate does not mean there is a corresponding duty by the State of 
arrival to welcome and accept them (on the “asymmetrical right to emigrate” 
see Scovazzi, “Human Rights and Immigration at Sea”, in Rubio-Marin (ed.), 
Human Rights and Immigration, Oxford, 2014, p. 212 ff.). This has led to a 
massive amount of unauthorized migrations, in respect of which we can make a 
general distinction between forced immigration resulting from the need to escape 
political persecution or contingent events (a war, revolution, environmental 
disaster) and immigration for economic reasons, stemming from endemic and 
unbearable misery (on the different meanings of “irregular immigrants” see 
Trevisanut, Immigrazione irregolare via mare. Diritto internazionale e diritto 
dell’Unione Europea, Napoli, 2012).
 The transit of migrants is particularly dramatic in the Mediterranean, 
as immigration by sea, though a minor percentage of the global phenomenon, 
entails serious risks to human life due to the methods of transportation used 
and the fact that most of the people attempting to cross to the opposite shore 
have little experience with salty waters, as pointed out in the paper written by T. 
and A. Stojanovski. It is a known fact that transnational criminal organizations 
control and profit from the entire chain of migratory movements, from the 
1  Professor of International Law, University of Naples “L’Orientale”, Holder of the Jean Monnet 
ad personam Chair on the Protection of Human Rights in the European Union; Director of the Jean 
Monnet Centre of Excellence on the Protection of Migrants Rights in the Mediterranean; President 
of the International Association of the Law of the Sea.
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departure, often from sub-Saharan countries, to transit through the desert, to 
detention in “refugee centres” along the southern coast of the Mediterranean, to 
embarkation on “mother” ships from which the immigrants are then moved to 
small, dilapidated boats directed toward the shores of European countries, up to 
the “assistance” provided when they finally reach land and their ultimate chosen 
destination. The natural “wall” that is the Mediterranean has recently been 
supplemented by artificial ones put up by several States on land, especially along 
the Balkan route, whose utilization increased significantly throughout 2015. 
How do we deal with this phenomenon? The challenge for countries of 
the northern coast, and especially for European Union (EU) Member States, all 
of which having decided, with the Treaty of Lisbon, to implement a common 
immigration policy, is to reconcile humanitarian aspects, considered a priority, 
with the need for border control and the requirement to prevent and combat crime. 
Naturally, as many have demanded, the problem should be resolved at the source 
by acting on the causes that compel so many to leave their own country, therefore 
“on land” rather than at sea. However, a discussion regarding this specific point 
merits much greater consideration that can be provided in the present context.
On a strictly humanitarian level, the most significant example so far has 
been “Operation Mare Nostrum”, launched by Italy following the tragedy that 
occurred off the coast of Lampedusa on 3 October 2013, resulting in over 350 
deaths. This operation, which lasted until the end of 2014, was a strictly national 
undertaking, though one wholly in compliance with EU principles on the matter. 
Means and men of various administrations were activated throughout a vast area 
of the Mediterranean (up to the coast of Libya), accomplishing a truly significant 
number of interventions and saving an untold number of human lives. The high 
cost of this operation, and the outspoken criticism of numerous EU partners, led 
to termination of the operation. The primary accusations, made by the domestic 
political opposition as well as by European governments (specifically Spain and 
Greece) consisted of an alleged incentive (“calling effect”) to departures, given 
the high probability of being intercepted in an extremely vast area, being “saved” 
by Italian patrol vessels, and accompanied to ports of the peninsula. In light of 
the tragic events taking place in the months following the cessation of Mare 
Nostrum, the merits of such accusations have been revealed to be groundless. 
Departures continue unremittingly, as do tragedies at sea, culminating in the 
carnage that took place on the night of 18 April 2015, with an undefined number 
of dead but one that was surely between 700 and 900 victims. The incentive 
to departure by sea, and this is also proven by the number and the tragedies of 
2015, is triggered only by the socio-political conditions of the countries of origin 
and transit, in addition to such contingent initiatives as the construction of a 
containment “wall” along the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Macedonian frontier, 
the rather forceful “rejections” by Greece and Spain (as noted by several 
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humanitarian organizations), and the restrictive visa policies recently adopted by 
many countries of northern Europe.
Operation Mare Nostrum has been replaced by “Operation Triton”, which 
has very different characteristics. It is, first of all, an operation that, though taking 
place in maritime spaces close to the Italian coastline, is managed and funded 
by the EU, specifically with the involvement of the Frontex Agency (“European 
Agency for the Management of International Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union”). This agency, with headquarters 
in Warsaw, was created by the EU for the purpose of coordinating air, maritime 
and land border patrols of EU States and to ensure implementation of agreements 
with countries bordering on the Union for the return of immigrants who are 
nationals of non-EU countries and who have been repelled along the borders. 
Secondly, the main objective of this operation is to monitor frontiers and not to 
protect human lives at sea, as stated by its Executive Director (statement made 
upon launching of operation Triton, available on the Frontex website: “According 
to the mandate of Frontex, the primary focus of operation Triton will be border 
control, however I must stress that, as in all our maritime operations, we consider 
saving lives an absolute priority for our agency”). It follows that, presumably 
(and as has been partly demonstrated by events during the first months of 2015), 
rescue at sea of immigrants will continue to be delegated to coastal States.
Another important aspect in managing the phenomenon of migration by 
sea is the prevention and suppression of crimes, both from the aspect of the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate and the exercise of force in respect of the ship and the 
persons on board, obviously in accordance with regulations and methods that 
differ according to the maritime spaces considered. The question of Migrants 
smuggling was the principal concern of the various institutions of the European 
Union during the final months of 2015. It was to combat this phenomenon that 
Operation EUNAVFOR Sophia was launched, an operation that resumes the 
“Atalanta” experience conducted off the waters of Somalian coasts to prevent 
and repress piracy. 
In reading the papers contained herein we have the perception that the 
legal instruments currently available are insufficient, in many cases obsolete, 
and are an inadequate response to the challenge of managing current migration 
flows. This holds true for international norms, the norms issued by the European 
Union as well as those of many domestic legal systems. The paper by E: Belja 
and S. Manduca, for example, demonstrates the difficulties involved in using 
Art. 110 of the UNCLOS to implement the right to visit on the high seas in the 
case of migrant smuggling.  As is known, this provision does not contemplate, 
among the exceptions to the exclusive power of control of the flag State, the case 
of smuggling immigrants, and only a broad interpretation of the definition of 
“slave trade” has sometimes allowed for the use of such power in situations such 
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as the one under review. Much more specific and detailed is the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 15 November 2000 (UN 
Doc. A/RES/55/25), whose Protocol No. 4 (Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air), in Article 8 (Measures against the smuggling of 
migrants by sea), deals with this issue.
The paper by E.D. Papastavridis is very interesting as it shows, first, how 
“challenges in the Mediterranean are mirrored in other regions”. Secondly, it 
deals with gaps in the legal framework, and in particular how can we define 
the term “place of safety” for people rescued at sea, as it is not made clear by 
SOLAS nor by SAR Convention.
T. and A. Stojanovski’s paper analyses the limits and shortcomings of the 
MARRI initiative (as well as its merits, of course). The paper by O. Koshevaliska, 
B. Tushevska Gavrilovikj and A. Nikodinovska Krstevska is an insightful 
analysis of Macedonia’s asylum domestic rules and is highly interesting as it 
shows how difficult it is for a small, young country to deal with this complicated 
issue and how the implementation of rules differs from the general framework 
imagined at the moment of their enactment. 
The testimonial from M. Smailovikj, a humanitarian NGO activist, is 
important mainly because it provides us with a glimmer of hope concerning the 
present refugee crisis in Macedonia and in Europe in general.
A useful book, in conclusion, which can concur in the effort of dealing with 
migration issues from a broader perspective not necessarily linked to any real or 
presumed emergencies. We must remember that the two and one half million 
Syrian refugees in Turkey, and the million refugees in tiny Lebanon represent 
a very different emergency from that of migrants knocking on the doors of the 
twenty-eight member States of the European Union.  
... The present volume comprises the written version of some of the interventions 
presented at the Conference. They touch upon the salient points of the discussions, 
and regard the comparison of prospects within international law and the regional 
approaches recently adopted. Their aim is to make a contribution to the legal 
literature currently available, and to offer many points for reflection, from the 
complexity of the legal picture on the subject of migration as a whole, and the 
responsibility of states in the matter of rescue at sea, to the main questions relating 
to problems of security inherent in migration in the Balkans.  Many other aspects are 
also considered beyond the legal, arising from this, including an analysis of some 
specific and critical humanitarian points intrinsic to the phenomenon of migration, 
and in particular of the current emergency of asylum seeking refugees. ...
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